as an “example” is adequate. For something to be capable of playing the role of
example, it must be generally and uncontroversially accepted as a member ofR
and as a T. The debater must, when he chooses an example, be careful to select
one that will fit public criteria of acceptability. Warranted extrapolation, clearly,
is context dependent and occurs, in particular, only when there is a background
of shared knowledge. For one grain of rice is an adequate exemplar of all only
if it is commonly known that all the rice has been cooked in the same pan, at
the same temperature, and with the same amount of water. It is for this reason
that the pattern of reasoning here is neither formally valid nor reducible to an
Aristotelian syllogism.^37
There is a strong pressure, nevertheless, to fit such arguments into a
deductive-nomological model. These arguments, the thought goes, rest on an
underlying lawlike universal generalization – that all the members of kind Rare
Ts. The argument is then enthymematic for a deductively valid one: Ra, all Rare
T\Ta. The role of the example, it is alleged, would be to provide empirical
support for the universal rule, either by being something which is both RandT,
or by being something which is neither RnorT. The pioneer indologist,
Stanisl¢aw Schayer, had a different idea.^38 He read the step labeled “example” in
the five-step proof as an application of a logical rule, the one we would now call
“universal instantiation.” This is the rule that permits one to infer from “("x)(Rx
ÆTx)” to “(Ra ÆTa)”. And he read the step called “application” as the applica-
tion of another logical rule, modus ponens. But he still sees the overall inference
as a formally valid one whose validity is a consequence of the fact that there is
a hidden premise “("x)(RxÆTx).”
More light can be thrown on this point if we examine the early Nya ̄ya
account of a pair of debating moves called the “likeness-based” rejoinder and
“unlikeness-based” rejoinder. A sophistical rejoinder (ja ̄ti) is a debating tactic in
which the opponent tries unsuccessfully to produce a counter-argument, an
argument designed to prove the opposite thesis. It is sophistical because the
counter-argument is based on a false or superficial resemblance. Nya ̄yasu ̄tra
5.1.2–3 state:
When there is assimilation through likeness or unlikeness, the likeness-based and
unlikeness-based rejoinders lead to the opposite property.
[The reply is:] the proof [of the thesis] is just like the proof of a cow from cowhood.One debater, debating properly, tries to prove that a certain object has a certain
property by pointing out that it is like another object which does have that prop-
erty. (The black cloud overhead now is like the cloud we saw yesterday – both
are black. But that cloud caused it to rain, so this one will too.) The opponent
now tries to counter by pointing out that the object is also like an object which
does not have the property. (The black cloud overhead is like the white cloud we
saw the day before yesterday – both are clouds. But that cloud did not cause rain,
so this one won’t either.)
434 jonardon ganeri