23 Joerg Tuske, “Being in Two Minds: The Divided Mind in the Nya ̄yasu ̄tra,”Asian
Philosophy9.3 (1999): 229–38. The “weak” division, in which rationality is
attributed only to the whole person and not to any of its subsystems, is that of
Davidson: Donald Davidson, “Paradoxes of Irrationality,” in R. Wollheim and J.
Hopkins, eds., Philosophical Essays on Freud(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), pp. 289–305.
24 The classic exposition: Udayana, A ̄tmatattvaviveka, pp. 710–19, p. 752. See also
Arindam Chakrabarti, “I Touch What I Saw,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research52 (1992): 103–17.
25 For further analysis of the Nya ̄ ya anti-reductionist argument: Jonardon Ganeri,
“Cross-modality and the Self,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Nov.
2000). There is interesting evidence from developmental psychology that an infant’s
acquisition of cross-modal capacities, specifically the ability to identify its own tac-
tually perceived facial expressions with the visually perceived facial expressions of
an imitating adult, is instrumental in its development of a sense of self; see Andrew
Meltzoff, “Molyneux’s Babies: Cross-Modal Perception, Imitation, and the Mind of
the Preverbal Infant,” in N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, and M. W. Brewer, eds., Spatial
Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
26 Nya ̄yabha ̄s.ya12, 7–16 (below 1.1.5).
27 Carakasam.hita ̄, su ̄ trastha ̄ na 11.13–14.
28 Upa ̄yahr.dayaorPrayogasa ̄ra. G. Tucci, Pre-Din.na ̄ga Buddhist Texts on Logic from
Chinese Sources(Baroda: Oriental Institute, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 49, 1929),
pp. xvii–xviii.
29 G. Tucci, Pre-Din.na ̄ga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. xviii.
30 VS 2.1.8: “It has horns, a hump, a hairy tail at the extreme and a dewlap – such is
the perceived mark of cowness.”
31 Nya ̄yabha ̄s.ya12, 4 (below 1.1.5).
32 The relations of master to property, matter to its altered condition, cause to effect,
efficient cause to caused, matter to form, concurrent occurrence, and hindering to
hindered. Further discussion: E. Frauwallner, “Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen
Sa ̄m.khya-Systems,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens2 (1958):
84–139. esp. pp. 123, 126–7; Nancy Schuster, “Inference in the Vais ́es.ikasu ̄ tras,”
Journal of Indian Philosophy1 (1972): 341–95; M. Nozawa, “Inferential Marks in
the Vais ́es.ikasu ̄ tras,” Sam.bha ̄s.a ̄: Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism 12
(1991): 25–38; Claus Oetke, “Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic
Reasoning,” Journal of Indian Philosophy24 (1996): 447–539.
33 Nya ̄yabha ̄s.ya12, 16–19 (below 1.1.5).
34 Jayara ̄s ́i,Tattvopaplavasim.ha74, 8–9.
35 H. N. Randle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1930), p. 148.
36 B. K. Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1998), p. 32.
37 For an anlysis of such reductive attempts in a wider context: Jonardon Ganeri,
“Indian Logic and the Colonisation of Reason,” in Jonardon Ganeri ed., Indian Logic:
A Reader(London: Curzon Press, 2001).
38 Stanisl¢aw Schayer, “Über die Methode der Nya ̄ ya-Forschung,” in O. Stein and W.
Gambert, eds., Festschrift für Moritz Winternitz (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 247–57.
Schayer’s paper is translated into English by Joerg Tuske in Jonardon Ganeri, ed.,
Indian Logic: A Reader(London: Curzon Press, 2001).
hinduism and the proper work of reason 445