the argument with great vigor. There was significant support for this kind of rea-
soning about God’s existence, but the Nya ̄ya position was also criticized on
logical grounds and with respect to its religious implications, not only by non-
theists but also by some theists who were not eager to adhere to a “God” (merely)
knowable by induction. The outcome was a widespread debate, which included
a variety of Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain interlocutors, and it was a debate which
made sense intellectually because “God” was accepted as a term worth arguing
about.^15
Many Hindu thinkers – in Nya ̄ya and Veda ̄nta, for instances – defended the
idea that the world has a maker. While this argument can certainly be treated
as philosophical, particularly regarding one’s preliminary understanding of
terms such as “cause” and “effect,” “world” and “person,” most of those willing
to debate the issue agreed to make the question of the nature of the cause a ques-
tion of the nature of God; and for many this was also a question of under-
standing God as known in scripture. In the Veda ̄nta version, the point is argued
repeatedly in key texts, such as Uttara Mı ̄ma ̄m.sa ̄Su ̄tras1.1, 2.1, and 2.2, often
in opposition to Sa ̄m.khya thinkers who held that there were two principles,
material and spiritual. By Sa ̄m.khya reasoning, the material principle itself
simply evolves into complex forms, and there is no need to hold that some spir-
itual power governs the material principle or is its ultimate source. According to
Veda ̄nta, the Upanis.ads offer a more reasonable explanation: the world cause
must be a unitary principle which evolves into both spiritual and material real-
ities. Since “God” is one of the more familiar terms (in English) for this spiritual
cause, and since terms such as “Brahman” do not shift the force of the argu-
ments significantly, the debate in general seems most easily described as
theological.
b) Whether God is one or many Even if it makes sense to argue about causality
- divine or other – and about the possible existence of a divine world-maker, it
requires a greater and more intense consensus to argue about further, more spe-
cific issues, such as whether more can be said about God. In some circles, though,
the topic of more specific knowledge of God was considered arguable, not merely
a matter of belief and personal preference but as a matter of sense and truth,
and was debated vehemently, in a debate best described as theological.
To draw on just one sectarian example: Veda ̄nta Des ́ika, the fourteenth-
century theologian of the Vis ́is.t.a ̄dvaita Veda ̄nta school (in turn rooted in the the-
ology of Ra ̄ma ̄nuja [eleventh century]), argues that there is only one ultimate
reality, who is the Lord Na ̄ra ̄yan.a (Vis.n.u) eternally accompanied by the Goddess
S ́rı ̄. At the same time Vis.n.u is also Brahman, the Reality described in the ancient
Upanis.ads. In his S ́rı ̄mad Rahasyatrayasa ̄ra, after a consideration of God’s per-
fections in relation to other components of reality, Des ́ika turns to the question
of Na ̄ra ̄yan.a’s relation to other deities. He argues that there can only be one true
God and it is possible and urgent to decide which deity is that true God. Since
religious practice and salvation are ultimately dependent on a right relationship
restoring “hindu theology” as a category 453