Whether or not one agrees that it makes sense to claim that God can assume
a physical body, I suggest that in the Hindu context this is an intelligible issue
perceived of as worthy of argument. So too, it is best seen as a marker of a debate
which is best understood as theological and not simply philosophical nor merely
a sectarian protestation.
d) The problem of evil The problem of evil is discussed in India as in the West,
despite important differences in the framing of the discussion, ranging from the
factor of rebirth to the significance rendered to pain itself. But theodicy was still
an issue: if there is a God (or transcendent world source) who is all-powerful,
how are suffering and inequality to be accounted for? In Uttara Mı ̄ma ̄m.sa ̄Su ̄tras
2.1.34–6 this question is addressed by both nondualist Veda ̄nta thinkers (such
as S ́am.kara) and theistic thinkers (such as Ra ̄ma ̄nuja). To argue that the intelli-
gent divine source who consciously arranged the world is cruel and unfair is also
an argument that the Veda ̄nta position in favor of a unitary material and spiri-
tual cause is ultimately incoherent; to support their view of the origin of the
world, the Veda ̄nta thinkers must account for evil. This argument, for and
against the idea that divine perfection is harmonious with the state of the world
as humans experience it, is important and intelligible in a theological context
where notions of God, divine power, moral standards of good and evil, respon-
sibility and guilt, are accepted as arguable and intelligible. While the argument
that there is an ultimate right order and justice in the world need not be theis-
tic, they are most likely theological. The problem of theodicy can arise because
there is some expectation of perfection or of an intelligible order, which leads to
the mounting of a defense of the world as a coherent and intelligible whole. If
there is no such perfection, the theology dissolves and the problem loses its
urgency.^19
e) The nature and time of liberation Another important question which serves to
mark off theological ground is whether liberation is possible within a given life-
time (as jı ̄vanmukti) or only after death. This too is a “boundary” question best
considered theological, since it relies on the premise that it is intelligible to speak
of “liberation,” and that arguing between the alternatives of “liberation while
alive” and “liberation after death” is important and makes sense, given intelligi-
ble positions about the world and the possibility and need for liberation. To be
sure, arguing about jı ̄vanmuktiinvolves factors which can be examined nonthe-
ologically: for example, estimates of the human condition, whether that condi-
tion can be radically improved, the means by which one overcomes the ailments
of life, why death might be considered not merely the end but also a transitional
state, and how one might even know that a person is to be judged not merely
holy or wise but actually liberated. The presuppositions are specific enough and
involve sufficient religious values that one can rightly see discussions of libera-
tion as most intelligible in a theological context.^20
restoring “hindu theology” as a category 455