Second, as conceded above, I admit that since we are speaking ofHinduthe-
ology and not just theology, the final test must occur in a communal context,
among thinkers who are willing to identify themselves as both “Hindus” and
“theologians.” If this chapter has been properly dedicated to a retrospective con-
sideration of where “theology” may be appropriately found in the Hindu tradi-
tions, it will still matter, and matter more, to discern the present and future of
Hindu theologizing by listening to those willing to think through the Hindu
faith(s) in a way that is intelligible in the contemporary, global conversation of
believers and scholars interested in religion.
Notes
1 It is not part of the task of this chapter to explain or defend usage of the word
“Hindu,” but see my comment at the conclusion of the chapter on the rehabilita-
tion of “Hindu” as a theological term.
2 See Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, vol. 15.1, cols. 342–6.
3 See Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe(Albany: State University of New York Press,
1988), particularly “On the Exclusion of India from the History of Philosophy,” pp.
145–9.
4 Over 40 years ago Richard DeSmet surveyed the Indian antipathy toward “theol-
ogy.” He showed how in the twentieth century it became commonplace to see “the-
ological” as equivalent to “burdened with dogmatic commitments” or “deficient in
rational excellence.” Even religious thinkers like S ́am.kara were best defended by
declaring, as did S. Radhakrishnan, that “the austere intellectualism of [S ́am.kara’s]
system, its remorseless logic, which marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs
of man, make it a great example of a purely philosophicalsystem” (Richard DeSmet,
unpublished dissertation, “The Theological Method of S ́am.kara,” Gregorian
University, Rome, 1955, p. 8; my emphasis). DeSmet’s thesis will be published in
2004 by the University of Notre Dame Press.
5 One also needs to be able to find one’s way back and forth between the terminology
of Sanskrit (and other Indian) languages and English (and other contemporary
Western and global) languages. This is not an endeavor for those who think that no
term in English can ever suitably represent a term from the Sanskrit language. While
we concede from the start that no single term from an Indian language can trans-
late “theology,” we need not be limited to the strictures of literal or one-to-one trans-
latability, and we need to resist the temptation to exclude all English-language terms
as inappropriate to the interpretation of Sanskrit discourses. As a model for the kind
of distinctions we need to make, we can recall Wilhelm Halbfass’s useful sorting out
of questions related to whether Hindu thought can be treated as “philosophy.” His
analysis combined philological interest in the uses of terms like dars ́ana(perhaps:
viewpoint, worldview), mata(opinion, school of thought), and anviks.ikı ̄ and
mı ̄ma ̄m.sa ̄(analysis, inquiry), with a sense of the larger comparative issues which
come into play when one affirms or denies that certain strands of Indian thought
should be acknowledged as philosophical. He rightly looks for exact correlates to
“philosophy,” but rightly too does not rule out the possibility of Indian philosophy
restoring “hindu theology” as a category 471