11 Albany: State University of New York, 1997.
12 Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2000.
13 In what follows, I refer to Sanskrit-language and (to some limited extent) Tamil-
language sources; of course, other language traditions of India can also be drawn
upon in this regard.
14 While God or gods can be theology’s central topic, this rule can bear exceptions.
Too rigid and exclusive a link between “God” and “theology” might unneces-
sarily exclude schools of Hindu thought which on other grounds might seem to
merit the title “theological,” e.g., Mı ̄ma ̄m.sa ̄ ritual theory and nondualist Veda ̄ nta.
One might still term a system theological if some other comprehensive explanatory
referent is put forward, such as a transcendent Self (a ̄tman), or a higher reality
which is the source of the world as a whole and yet also the pervasive life-force
within it (brahman), or an apprehension of the world in all its interconnected parts
(dharma).
15 See Johannes Bronkhorst, “God’s Arrival in the Vais ́es.ika System,” Journal of Indian
Philosophy24 (1996): 281–394, and George Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theo-
logy: Introduction to Udayana’s Nya ̄yakusuma ̄ñjali, p. 78. On the development of the
argument about God in the Buddhist context, see Roger Jackson, “Dharmakı ̄rti’s
refutation of theism,” Philosophy East and West 36.4 (1985): 315–48.
Dharmakı ̄rti’s critique of the argument from effects to the existence of God is also
described briefly in Gerhard Oberhammer, “Der Gottesbeweis in der Indische
Philosophie,” NumenXII.1 (1965): 1–34, esp. 10–22. On the general project of the
Nya ̄ ya induction of God’s existence, see also Kisor K. Chakrabarti, Classical Indian
Philosophy of Mind(Albany: State University of New York, 1999), pp. 159–73; for
reflection on the induction in a comparative context, see Francis X. Clooney, SJ, “The
Interreligious Dimension of Reasoning about God’s Existence,” International Journal
of the Philosophy of Religion46.1 (1999): 1–16.
16 See “Veda ̄ nta Des ́ika’s “Definition of the Lord” (I ̄s ́varapariccheda) and the Hindu
Argument about Ultimate Reality,” in Ultimate Realities, ed. Robert Neville (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 95–123.
17 Narasim.ha ̄s ́ramin (sixteenth century) offers this critique in the third part of
hisAdvaita Dı ̄pika ̄. Against the view that it is appropriate to describe Brahman as
possessed of certain qualities which enable one to identify who God is,
Narasim.ha ̄s ́ramin argues that sectarian symbolizations of the divine and indeed all
positive language about Brahman can only be secondary. Sectarian views rely on
misreadings of the Upanis.ads; even texts which attribute qualities such as omni-
science to Brahman are simply corrective of misconceptions, and not positively
informative about real qualities existing in Brahman. All texts which describe God
with attributes must be interpreted in conformity with primary texts which deny
that Brahman has qualities. Distinct gods are really just one, diversely understood;
seeAdvaitadı ̄pika ̄pp. 447–63.
18 I.2.38–9; see my exposition of this theme in ch. 4 ofHindu God, Christian God.
19 On theodicy, see Michael Stoeber, Evil and the Mystics’ God: Toward a Mystical Theod-
icy(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1991), and Francis X. Clooney, “Evil, Divine
Omnipotence and Human Freedom: Vedanta’s Theology of Karma,” Journal of Reli-
gion69 (1989): 530–48.
20 See Andrew O. Fort, Jı ̄vanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and
Neo-Veda ̄nta(SUNY, 1998), and Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, eds. Andrew O.
Fort and Patricia Y. Mumme (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
restoring “hindu theology” as a category 473