against the very forces unleashed – uncontrollably – by mobilization, forces for
which the attainment of democratic power was irrelevant. Missionaries killed or
nuns raped in the “defense of Hinduism” were law and order problems for the
government – even or especially when that government was led by the BJP. Even
far less extreme acts, like the Parivar’s condemnation of the BJP’s attempts to
woo Muslims into its fold (not entirely unsuccessful), were problematic to a party
engaged in procedural politicking. From representing itself as the only party
capable of controlling Hindu nationalism, the BJP became the party most
directly attacked by Hindu nationalists.
Culture vs. politics
What had happened was that a chasm had opened up between religiocultural
goals and politics ends. Any tectonic shift in the Indian polity, if it comes, is there-
fore not likely to happen in the political landscape, but under a vaster, less clearly
contoured cultural terrain.
In a sense, we can see the battle over the future of Hindutva as one between
the visions of Savarkar and Golwalkar. The experience of Hindu nationalists in
democratic power suggests that Savarkar’s vision of a directly political transfor-
mation of India into a Hindu state is not, as far as we can see in 2002, likely to
be realized. Hindutva ideologues came to understand this over the course of the
years the BJP first came to national power. Despite the occasional polemical
twitch (reviving the plan to reclaim Hindu “sacred sites” from mosques) and the
institutional jerk (replacing Congress appointees on national academic bodies
with those more sympathetic to Hindutva readings of history and culture), the
inertia of coalition politics and the dictates of a fractious yet astute Indian elec-
torate appeared to keep the BJP from becoming an effective vehicle for the recast-
ing of the Indian polity. Ironically, where the BJP-led government had any
success, it was in matters of economic governance and international relations,
where Hindutva ideology played no role. This scarcely led to any a congruence
of interest between the BJP high command and the rest of the Parivar.
The longer the BJP stayed in limited power, the more Hindu nationalism
seemed to take on a religiocultural manifestation. The VHP began to organize the
engagement of Hindu religious figures and organization in debates about the
nature of India. The RSS ideal of a change in Hindu culture as the prerequisite
for the creation of the Hindu nation seemed more and more the sustainable goal
of Hindutva activity. During the great festival of the Maha Kumb Mela in
Allahabad in 2001, for example, the VHP succeeded in organizing a “Hindu
Sansad” or Convocation of religious figures, bringing under one roof what nearly
amounted to a collective Hindu papacy, demonstrating the strength of the idea
that there could be one unified “Hinduism.” Although – and perhaps precisely
because – many religious figures, orders, and organizations warned against such
a gathering becoming used for “political” ends by the VHP, the general principle
of pan-Hindu meetings and agreement seem to have been presupposed. To the
548 c. ram-prasad