necessary” to explain human behavior; and by “commonsense” purposive-
ness, he simply means, “the actor chooses the action which will maximize
utility (p. 14). But this description is only a partial representation of Weber ’s
understanding of reason. Weber ’s sociological method distinguishes between
practical, theoretical, substantive, and formal types of rationality. Although
he demonstrates that both practical and formal rationality involve means-
ends calculations similar to what Horkheimer and Adorno later call “instru-
mental reason,” Weber also shows that substantive and theoretical reason are
distinctively different. Thus, while the logic of dissimilar actions like sacrifice
or prayer might be compared to a modern business executive’s calculation
of efficiency and profit, substantive judgements of beauty, friendship, com-
passion and mutual assistance involve a very different approach to reason-
ing and decision-making (Kalberg 1980:1148).
A thought experiment proposed by Amartya K. Sen serves to illustrate
what Weber means by such distinctions. While challenging the idea that indi-
viduals always choose and act in a way that maximizes personal gain, Sen
imagines a situation in which a person is asked by a passer-by, “Where is the
railway station?” When the addressee responds, “There” and then points in
the direction of a post office, the questioner responds, “Would you mind post-
ing this letter for me on the way?” Sen argues that this kind of interaction
challenges rational choice assumptions about reason; for, based on their
premises, we ought to assume that the person asked to deliver the letter will
reply “Yes,” because he calculates that this decision will allow him to open
the letter on the way in order to see if it contains anything valuable (1977:332).
But does such an assumption make any sense? Must one really assume that
this decision will (or should) naturally be driven by narrow self-interest?
Other values and commitments might surely influence the choice made by
the individual – and understandably so. This choice cannot be reduced sum-
marily to maximizing utility, but may be influenced by habit, custom, a sense
of duty, emotional attachment, etc. In Weberian terms, forms of rationality
are sometimes employed in decision-making that cannot be reduced to max-
imizing personal gain.
A rational choice theorist might try to argue that such non-maximizing
choices are in fact “irrational.” Weber does note that from the perspective of
one type of rationality, another form of reasoning can appear to be non-ratio-
nal (Kalberg 1980:1156). What Horkheimer and Adorno argue in their inter-
pretation of Weber ’s treatment of rationality, however, is that it is purposive
158 • Christopher Craig Brittain