without the danger of expressive individualism since it is based on recogni-
tion and reciprocity. The Habermasian view of modernity is therefore not
coincidental with the view that modernity culminates in instrumental forms
of rationality. Rational analysis, for Habermas, is not impersonal, since it relies
on ongoing hermeneutic dialogue between experts and non-experts. It is also
not conceived in terms of manipulation, since at the heart of a communica-
tive theory is the idealization of an anticipated consensus on issues of pub-
lic health and welfare. And, finally, it does not require the rejuvenation of
religion in the form of spirituality because of the experiential basis of reli-
gious language as grounded in cultic praxis. It is symptomatic of postmod-
ernism to perpetuate the subject-object model of human relations insofar as
religious language is encouraged as part of individual expression rather than
a more dialogical approach, since individuals are encouraged to relate to
themselves and others through the realm of fantasy (subject-object) rather
than sustained communicative action (consensus, dialogue). This being the
case, Walter ’s distinctions between modernity, late modernity, and post-
modernity all begin to blur, since they share a non-dialogical element, how-
ever “good on discourse” postmodernism may appear to be.
Given Habermas’s comments about the difficulties in translating religious
language, the conditions for recognition are foreclosed upon, rather than
encouraged by, religious language. As psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin notes,
assertion expresses both authorship (moral accountability) and agency (auton-
omy) while recognition expresses the capacity to set limits to whatever is
asserted – a way of establishing a boundary between self and other. When
the delicate tension of mutual recognition breaks down, and Benjamin argues
that this is both inevitable and common, assertion can become a destructive
form of aggression (Benjamin 1988:28). The manifestation of aggression occurs
when boundaries between individuals are rendered insubstantial (Benjamin
1988: 39). This is precisely why expressive individualism is a problem. When
the individuals are encouraged to develop their own personal myths to live
(and die) by, the utterly subjective nature of such expressions cannot be any-
thing other than assertions until translated by others. Naturally, the labori-
ous work of translation, when possible, takes time and energy. It is possible,
even though religious language is resistant to translation, but given the
context of dying, even when prolonged, time and translation skills are not
necessarily something that health care professions have. In contrast to the
postmodern vision of autonomy, the vision of autonomy shared by Habermas
196 • Kenneth G. MacKendrick