I also counter Stark’s assumptions, that religion is a matter of choice. My
argument follows Daniel Bell in the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism([1976]
1996) that
the force of religion does not derive from any utilitarian quality (of self-
interest or individual need); religion is not a social contract...The power
of religion derives from the fact that...it was the means of gathering
together, in one overpowering vessel, the sense of the sacred – that which
is set apart as the collective conscience of the people. (Bell [1976] 1996:154)Religion serves to legitimate the social relations that constitute people’s lives,
and thus “to say then that ‘God is dead’ is, in effect, to say that the social
bonds have snapped and that society is dead” (Bell [1976] 1996:155). Contrary
to Stark, religion is never separate from the social relations that it represents.
To the extent it exerts social control or inspires rebellion, religion exists as
part of the social relations between people as Robert Merton ([1949] 1967:44)
argued; it is not a fashion or commodity that a person can choose to accept
or discard at any moment, any more than a person can simply accept or dis-
card the social facts that constitute society.
Section I: Rational Choice Theory in Overview
Stark’s work represents the latest and boldest installment of rational-choice
theory. The following overview is not a summary or literature review, but a
critique of rational-choice theory.
Over the last several decades, rational choice theory has battled with a
variety of other theories to explain much of human behavior. Initially, schol-
ars applied the concept of rational choice primarily to political issues, and
then primarily to social movements with political objectives. Mancur Olson’s
([1964] 1971) work on social movements is a foundational and well-known
example. Even before Olson, however, some argued that all modern institu-
tions, organizations, and even beliefs and values, not just social movements,
are based on rational choice, including deeply held moral values. Among
these values, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that even, or especially,
democracy is based on what they call the “calculus of consent.” Democracy
consists of nothing more or less than rational calculation of cost versus benefit,
both at the operational level of institutions, and within the individual who
votes for candidates, agendas, etc.
The Concept of Choice in the Rise of Christianity • 225