Weber argues that “it would be very unusual to find concrete cases of action,
especially of social action, which were oriented only in one or another of
these ways” (Weber 1978:26) referring to various types of action. Subjective
emotions differ fundamentally from rational calculation, such that “formu-
lation of subjective meaning in the case of erotic attraction or of personal
loyalty or any other affectual type, than for example, in the case of a busi-
ness contract” (Weber 1978:28) constitute very different types of motivation
and action.
The business contract is limited in scope and is itself the direct product of
modern instrumental rationality. In contrast, things like erotic attraction, loy-
alty, and spiritual devotion are far more complex, and of a different orienta-
tion to the world. Being different, the sensibility of faith may, and often is,
in conflict with the means-end, cost-benefit calculation of instrumental ration-
ality. Thus, rational-choice theory, as constituted today, cannot explain religion
(or anything else) that is not of the instrumentally rational type. Rational-
choice theory also cannot explain irrationaldecision-making, but that is also
beyond the scope of this chapter.
Section II: The Failure of Rational Choice Theory Regarding
Religion
Therefore I contend that rational-choice theory as used in sociology and as
applied to religion begins from two major mistakes, which proponents take
as assumptions: 1) that instrumental rationality is a universal truth, consis-
tent among all times and places, and that 2) choice derived from a cost benefit
assessment of risk versus trust enables all social behavior, which therefore
consists only of cost-benefit decisions. Thus, rational-choice theory replaces
different forms of decision-making with one form only. Rational-choice the-
ory, as Stark applies it to Christianity, depends on similar assumptions: that
- Christianity in the crisis years of 300–476 CE was clearly and essentially
different from pagan traditions, and 2) a variety of choices were available for
selection in an open religious market. My critique thus approaches rational-
choice explanations on theoretical grounds and historical grounds. In short,
it is neither a logical possibility nor historically accurate. Let us examine
Stark’s key conclusions.
In the search for universal evidence outside of modern society in order to
demonstrate the trans-historical accuracy of rational-choice theory, Stark
The Concept of Choice in the Rise of Christianity • 229