tices. They do not order – nor is their purpose to order – the doing of prac-
tices. This explains their inadequacy, and in so doing speaks to the so-called
postmodern dilemma. Texts, institutions and formal rules are inherently
ambiguous as principles of order. But, this is not in itself a problem. Texts don’t
need to be adequate as instructions for action, or the interpretation of action,
because they are not the driving force behind either the enactment, or the
understanding, of practices. They are important as retrospective accounts.
The problem arises when beliefs and rules are treated as the organizing prin-
ciples of social action. Social order then becomes a mystery involving infinite
levels of narrative interpretation of belief and value.
It follows that while beliefs are by necessity always ambiguous, the prac-
tices, which in detailed ways lead to the creation of those beliefs, are not.
According to Durkheim (1912) the purpose, or function, of beliefs is to confirm
the legitimacy of practices, so as to encourage people to participate in them,
not to represent the truth about the origin and functions of such practices.
Nor is it the work of beliefs to instruct people in how to perform practices.
Ironically, although Durkheim argued that practices should be the focus of
an empirical sociology of social facts (Durkheim 1895; 1912; Rawls 2005) the
discipline he helped to found has made the study of beliefs and values, and
related variable analysis, its central focus, and done so in his name. Durkheim
argued that, already in his own day, treating beliefs as primary had created
the appearance of error and confusion, just as treating rules as primary had
created a parallel ambiguity in the understanding of meaning and social struc-
ture. But, the ambiguity, or inadequacy, in each case, is not, and never was,
a problem for social actors. It is practices that must be held to high standards
of coherence and reproducibility, not beliefs. Beliefs merely provide a narra-
tive account, or reason, for the enactment of practices that, as C. Wright Mills
(1940) said, can be invoked retrospectively to maintain the appearance of for-
mal institutionalcoherence.
The detailed analysis of religious services presented in this paper is designed
to show that the specific practices of speaking in tongues, the interpretation
of tongues, prophecy, and the discernment of spirits, involve a complex orga-
nization and presentation of practices that are treated by practitioners as evi-
dence of a belief experience. It is important to note that conceptualizing
expressions of the Spirit as socially structured does not negate the religious
belief that these gifts are divine in origin. Although Pentecostals describe
their public worship as a means of spiritually connecting individuals to God,
Speaking in Tongues: A Dialectic of Faith and Practice • 257