The Economist December 4th 2021 Middle East & Africa 53ChinaandAfrica
Pomp and
circumspection
W
henpresident XiJinpingofChina
meets African leaders, grandiose
claims abound. On this count, at least, the
triennial diplomatic jamboree known as
the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation
(focac), held recently in Senegal, did not
disappoint. China and Africa have “forged
unbreakable fraternity”, declared Mr Xi,
who spoke from China by video. Mr Xi
painted a dazzling picture of SinoAfrican
ties, saying they feature “sincere friend
ship and equality, winwin for mutual ben
efit and common development, fairness
and justice, and progress with the times
and openness and inclusiveness”.
In truth, relations between African
countries and China are rather less sunny
and far less equal. But they are deep. China
has financed, developed or operates 35 big
African ports and thousands of miles of
roads and railways. Trade in goods be
tween Africa and China, which reached al
most $200bn in 2019, far surpasses that
with America (though is less than that with
the eu). Infrastructure loans have made
China Africa’s biggest bilateral creditor. For
some time Africans have fretted that China
is creating debttraps by lending too much,
or with conditions that may allow it to
seize ports or airports if payments are not
kept up. But after the latest shindig, many
may now worry that, far from lending too
much, China is losing interest in Africa.
The aid offered at focac certainly sug
gests that China is stemming the flow of
cash. At each of the previous meetings, in
2015 and 2018, it announced it would pro
vide $60bn in new financing. This time its
financial pledges added up to $40bn.
These will be spread across some $10bn of
China’s new reserves (known as special
drawing rights) from the imf, $10bn in
loans to African financial institutions,
$10bn in trade finance and a target of $10bn
of investment by Chinese firms. It also
promised 1bn doses of covid19 vaccines.
The shrinking promises of future lar
gesse match what is already happening on
the ground. In 2019 Chinese lending to Af
rica fell to $7bn from a peak of $28bn in
2016, according to the ChinaAfrica Re
search Initiative at Johns Hopkins Univer
sity. This is partly because several African
countries struggled to repay their loans
and asked China for debt relief. Meanwhile
Chinese construction and engineering
firms’ African revenues have been sliding
steadily since 2015.
Yet money is not the only thing that
China has to offer to cement its links to Af
rican countries. Its policy of noninterfer
ence in domestic affairs means it is just as
happy dealing with despots as it is with
democrats (see Chaguan). It trumpets this
by saying that its aid comes without politi
cal strings attached, though in fact it ex
pects countries getting Chinese aid to sup
port it in international organisations and
to suppress criticism about its own abuses
of human rights. Importantly, it promises
to treat Africans with respect and as
equals. Yet at focac meetings, African
leaders kowtow, lavishing praise on China
and obeying its demand that they treat Tai
wan as part of China, before going capin
hand for help. It is quite clear who is first
among these equals.
Despite their grovelling, many African
delegates at focac were not starryeyed
about Chinese involvement in Africa. Félix
Tshisekedi, the president of Congo, argued
that the partnership would benefit Africa
more if African countries were given better
access to the Chinese market. On the side
lines of the event some delegates ques
tioned Mr Xi’s promises. “Will it result in
action on the ground?” asked one. “I’m
sceptical.” Such concerns are common at
Westernled Africa conferences, too—
though China is generally better at actually
honouring its promises, says Deborah
Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University.
Even so, China’s help is now less dis
tinctive than it was in the past, when it was
more willing than other donors to finance
big infrastructure projects aimed at help
ing Africa industrialise, laments Carlos
Lopes, an economist at the University of
Cape Town. These days “it’s about Africa as
a consumption market,” he says.
Even as China’s involvement in Africa
begins to look more like the West’s, West
ern countries are starting to mimic China.
On a recent visit to Nigeria Antony Blin
ken, America’s secretary of state, sounded
almost Chinese when he said America had
provided vaccines against covid19 “with
no political strings attached”. This week
the euannounced a $340bn global infra
structure scheme called Global Gateway,
which is billed as a rival to China’s Belt and
Road Initiative, which finances ports,
roads and other infrastructure (see Charle
magne). In June America spearheaded the
formation of Build Back Better World, an
initiative by the g7, to do the same.
China’s ties to Africa are less distinctive
and less threatening than sometimes
claimed. Some Western leaders may be pri
vately crowing over China’s retrenchment,
seeing it as a blow to Chinese influence. Yet
it is hardly a win if Africa loses not just the
roads, ports and bridges that China builds,
but also the bargainingpower it gets from
playing off China againstthe West—to get a
better deal for itself.nDAKAR
Africa’s ties to China and the West are
starting to look more alike
IranIn need of water,
not uranium
T
he atmospherein Vienna is suitably
grim. On November 29th diplomats
gathered for yet more negotiations meant
to salvage the nuclear deal that Iran signed
with six world powers in 2015, known as
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(jcpoa). The two main parties to the talks,
America and Iran, are not talking directly
(at the latter’s insistence). Instead, Euro
pean diplomats act as intermediaries, car
rying messages back and forth along frigid
city streets made empty and silent by a co
vid19 lockdown.
The jcpoaset limits on Iran’s nuclear
programme in exchange for the lifting of
many international economic sanctions.
Donald Trump pulled America out of the
deal in 2018. Joe Biden was elected on a pro
mise to revive it. This is the seventh round
of talks since he took office in January. But
it is the first since his new Iranian counter
part, Ebrahim Raisi, was installed in Au
gust after a farcical election that saw most
wouldbe challengers disqualified.
If America is to blame for causing the
crisis, Iran is largely at fault for prolonging
it. The jcpoaallows Iran to enrich uranium
to 3.67% purity. It breached that limit in
2019 and is exceeding it to an ever greater
degree. Earlier this year it enriched urani
um up to 60%, a level that has no civilian
use and is a whisker from weaponsgrade.
The un’s International Atomic Energy
Agency reported in November that Iran
had stockpiled more than 2,300kg of en
riched uranium, 11 times the level permit
ted in the deal. That includes 17.7kg at 60%D UBAI
As nuclear talks resume, Iran’s regime
is rattled by protests