LARS TO/NDERson is. The way it does so may change over time, but its purpose is always to connect
abstractions about human existence with the embodied expressions through which citi-
zens ‘‘image’’ their social circumstances. The imaginary is in that sense akin to what Hegel
callsGedanken in das Vorstellen, that is, a mode of ‘‘picture thinking’’ that presents itself
through performances and storytelling.^2 But unlike Hegel, who seeks to overcome picture
thinking, this essay makes no such attempt. To the contrary, I suggest that we view the
underlying performances and stories as the most profound way of expressing the nature
of reason. I do so because the performances and stories, invoking the embodied circum-
stances under which reason arises, operate just as much in the register of affect as in the
register of explicit consciousness. They connect, we might say, the procedural nature of
reason to the bodily dispositions that sustain this nature.
The importance of this connection is evident once we realize how the model of rea-
sonable toleration legitimizes itself through privileging a limited group of Enlightenment
thinkers, among which the most prominent are Locke and Kant. At first, this privileging
may seem uncontroversial because of the originality with which these thinkers approach
the issues of tolerance and toleration. But the closer we look, the more evident it becomes
that at stake is a particularly contentious version of the ontological imaginary of reason.
This version begins by depicting reason as a disembodied faculty of cognition. It then
draws a strict dividing line between those aspects of human existence that matter ontolog-
ically and those that are indifferent. Moreover, it tries to ensure that any analysis of
tolerance and toleration adheres to three imperatives of thought: namely, neutrality, dis-
passionateness, and systematicity. Both aspects—the identification of the indifferent and
the three imperatives—then lead to an image of reason in which reason organizes its
activities independently of how those who embody these activities experience the world
on an everyday basis.
I claim that this image is flawed because of its tendency to misrecognize the bodily
dispositions from which reason arises. I also claim that this tendency prevents the model
of reasonable toleration from approaching the issues of tolerance and toleration in a way
that appreciates the unique nature of both. But I would like to emphasize that the defense
of these claims is not the prospect of articulating the real essence of tolerance and tolera-
tion. It may be that there is such an essence, but it is unlikely that we, in the event it
appeared, would be able to recognize its form and content. Rather, I defend my claims by
showing how the effect that the image produces (as opposed to, say, its truthfulness or
authenticity) is a disconnection oftolerancefromtoleration: that is, a disconnection of the
disposition to endure pain and suffering (tolerance) from the institutional framework
accommodating minority groups, through principles such as free exercise of religion and
separation of church and state (toleration).^3 The stakes of this disconnection are high.
Not only is the ability to endure pain and suffering an important part of our commitment
to the principles of toleration, but also, since the disconnection implies relegating toler-
ance to the unexamined background, it entails a lopsidedness in how we approach the
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