TOLERATION WITHOUT TOLERANCEKing, for example, finds that ‘‘only the most general comments are called for on Voltaire,’’
because he was ‘‘more of an impressionist and journalist than a thinker,’’ who swung
‘‘wildly from a desire to defend the right of religious views’’ to a ‘‘somewhat contradictory
desire’’ to fight the Catholic Church.^21 Rainer Forst, whom we encountered earlier, is
more generous in his commentary, although he too finds Voltaire’s defense of religious
pluralism to be inherently flawed, arguing that ‘‘although reason speaksagainstany dog-
matic pretension of unconditionality... , it doesnot, as Voltaire thought, speakfora
religion of reason.’’ In fact, Forst argues, if reason is to provide a solid foundation for the
issues of tolerance and toleration, it must approach its own regime as more than yet
‘‘another particular belief.’’^22
My interest in these comments stems not so much from what they say about the
legacy of Voltaire as from what they say about the kind of argument that counts as reason-
able in the contemporary discussion of tolerance and toleration. They do so in an implicit
manner, one in which the criteria by which we judge other images of reason are hidden
in the judgment itself. Even so, if we listen carefully, we find three imperatives of thought
at work in the commentaries by King and Forst. These imperatives seek to regulate the
way contemporary theorists approach the issues of tolerance and toleration:
1.The imperative of systematicity.The first imperative states that our approach must
be systematic and coherent. This may sound uncontroversial, because these are the terms
that lend credibility to theory in general. To demand systematicity and coherence, how-
ever, is also to demand independence of context, a demand that detaches the theorist
from the circumstances in which everyday politics is lived. It also detaches the theorist
from the bodily dispositions in which his or her theoretical apparatus is set. Both detach-
ments make it difficult to approach the issues of tolerance and toleration in light of
concrete experiences where pain and suffering elude strict control. Since this elusiveness
is an important part of tolerance proper, we might thus say that the first imperative
encourages the separation of tolerance from toleration, relegating the former to the unex-
amined background.
2.The imperative of dispassionateness. The second imperative that we find in the
comments by King and Forst states that our approach must be dispassionate. Again, this
may not sound controversial, because the practice of being tolerant of others entails the
ability to curb one’s inclination to anathematize or persecute. But the imperative of dis-
passionateness also implies that we can be neither ardent nor enthusiastic about being a
tolerant person. This takes away the inspiring dimensions of this kind of subjectivity. It
also impairs the attempt to imagine, not to mention encourage, a political sensibility (as
opposed to, say, a disinterested procedure or formal institution) in which tolerance is
cardinal. Thus, it may be that a certain kind of wildness or affective intensity is desirable
when it comes to the way in which we approach the issues of tolerance and toleration.
3.The imperative of neutrality. The third imperative embodied by Voltaire’s critics is
that our approach to the issues of tolerance and toleration must be neutral with regard to
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