TOLERATION WITHOUT TOLERANCEThe overall ambition of the Kantian project is to show that it is possible to be both
the legislator and the judge of our own laws. This kind of self-government is possible,
argues Kant, if intelligent individuals surrender themselves to the discipline of reason—
what he callsdie Disziplin der reinen Vernunft^24 —which holds that it is in the interest of
reason never to take anything for granted, but instead to be engaged in what Foucault
later would call the ‘‘critical attitude of modern civilization.’’^25 This is an attitude that,
first, encourages those who reason to think for themselves and, second, obliges them to
listen to the better argument, permitting them to embody the motto of the Enlighten-
ment—sapere aude—have courage to use your own understanding.^26 What is more, al-
though this discipline may expose the reasonable to the unreasonable, Kant is certain that
reason will emerge vindicated from such an exposure. The argument for this is that reason
thrives in an open society, where citizens are able to speak their minds in public and
where reason can test its claims. So what appears to be contrary to reason—that someone
should listen to unreason or speak unreasonably—is, in fact, part of reason itself. It is
because of this that we may say that toleration (understood as a system of government
accommodating minority groups) is a demand of reason. Kant argues this inCritique of
Pure Reason:
Reason must in its entire undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit free-
dom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a dam-
aging suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing is so sacred,
that it may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect
for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has
no dictatorial authority; its verdict is simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom
each must be permitted to express, without let or hindrances, his objections or even
his veto.^27It is easy to find the democratic tendencies in this statement. Even so, we should be extra
attentive to presuppositions that support these tendencies.^28 A few surprises await us here.
For example, despite his praise of freedom of religion—and, thus, of toleration—Kant is
not eager to affirm tolerance proper, but states instead that a prince must decline the
presumptuous title of this concept (den hochmu ̈tigen Namen der Toleranz) if he wants to
call himself enlightened.^29 Likewise, although he affirms the value of reason’s listening to
unreason—and, thus, of letting reason encounter pain and suffering—Kant is not eager
to affirm the questioning of reason ‘‘all the way down’’ but states instead that there are
certain limits to what we can bring into question in order to be reasonable. These limits—
which surface in the discussion of the categorical imperative and the postulates of rea-
son—prevent Kant from appreciating the unique nature not only of toleration but also
of tolerance.
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