MATTHEW SCHERERnamely, that the human capacity for reason is the basis for moral considerations, and the
force of his rhetorical ethos, more precisely, the implication that Rawls’s procedure is
more direct, natural, and trustworthy than his contenders’. The exclusion of ‘‘imagination
and wit, beauty and grace,’’ from the discussion at a rhetorical level functions as a micro-
political device of persuasion, and a reader senses the inadequacy of perfectionism before
coming to know what it is. At work here is an appeal by Rawls’s reasonable character to
the respect owed to reason itself.
Another example will draw out some of the ways in which Rawls mobilizes his read-
ers’ emotional responses to bolster his arguments. In the preface toPolitical Liberalism,
Rawls writes, ‘‘I try to preserve, perhaps unsuccessfully, a certain conversational style,’’
and this ‘‘conversational’’ style invites the reader to embrace the very receptiveness to
reasoning, in the sense of hearing, weighing, and selecting the best available argument,
congruent with Rawls’s moral and political program.^44 Consider the opening lines of
Political Liberalism,and the tone they set for the text. Rawls says, ‘‘Perhaps I should, then,
begin with a definition of political liberalism and explain why I call it ‘political.’ But no
definition would be useful at the outset.Instead I begin with a first fundamental question
about political justice in a democratic society.’’^45 Rawls introduces hisTheory of Justice
with a similar gesture. There he begins: ‘‘I sketch some of the main ideas.... The exposi-
tion is informal and intended to prepare the way for the more detailed arguments that
follow.’’^46 Were Rawls not so closely identified with the tradition of analytical philosophy,
his embarkation upon these projects of rigorous philosophical argumentation by begin-
ning a ‘‘conversation’’ with his audience and posing a question or a sketch rather than
offering a definition would not be remarkable. But he is correctly identified with that
tradition, and thus it is pertinent to see what he derives from departing from its norms.
That Rawls begins with a question or a sketch signals his intent, present throughout
Political LiberalismandA Theory of Justice, to elicit the reader’s active involvement in the
work at hand.
While the conversation that takes place in what Rawls has called the ‘‘original posi-
tion’’ has been justly criticized as no real conversation at all, the conversation opened by
Political Liberalismis of another order. There, to pose a question to the reader is to imply
that it is to be answered—it is to level a challenge and, perhaps, to open an engagement.
Rawls is not in the least naı ̈ve on this count: he knows that the conversational form
implied by the back and forth rhythm of question and answer tends to elicit a certain
range of normative considerations. The demands of attentiveness, responsiveness, polite-
ness, and so forth come to mind. It may well be that the more powerfully the norms of
conversation are installed in the text, the less apt the reader will be inclined to dissent
radically from the conclusions of the theory. It’s not inconceivable, either, that he or she
should become less likely to turn away from the discussion altogether. Or, to borrow the
language of Rawls’s own moral psychology, a reader may feel worthy only if he or she
does not shirk the obligation to give and take reasons that all parties to the conversation
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