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NOTES TO PAGES 279–92

3. Ibid., 28.


4. Ibid.


5. Ibid., 31.


6. Ibid., 31 and 34.


7. Ibid., 40.


8. Ibid., 40–41.


9. Ibid., 56–57.


10. Ibid., 63.


11. Ibid., 254.


12. Ibid., 254–55.


13. In a thoughtful essay, ‘‘A Postmodern Return to Orthodoxy: Leo Strauss’s Early Critique
    of Modern Liberalism,’’ delivered at the fall 2003 convention of the American Political Science
    Association in Philadelphia, Miguel Vatter contends that Strauss ‘‘envisages a return to orthodoxy
    that is both ‘postmodern’ and ‘democratic’ ’’ (3). He also argues that Strauss attempts to display the
    dependence of classical reason on faith. While impressed with Vatter’s reading, I do not seek to
    decide whether Strauss is a believer or thinks most people must have such a belief in order to
    contain themselves.


14. William James,The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy(New York:
    Dover, 1956), x.


15. William J. Bennett,Why We Fight(New York: Doubleday), 79.


16. Reported in Nicholas Kristoff, http://forums.nytimes.com/webin/WebX?50@@.f3beae7
    (August 17, 2003).


17. Bennett,Why We Fight, 86.


18. For a rich history of the ‘‘Radical Enlightenment’’ in Europe, the pivotal role Spinoza
    played in it, the harsh punishments meted out to those in Holland, France, Germany, and England
    for a hundred years who either avowed Spinozism or were accused of it, and the ways in which the
    political advent of Spinozism helped to create space for the ‘‘Moderate Enlightenment,’’ see Jona-
    than Israel,Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750(Cambridge:
    Cambridge University Press, 2001). I review this book and probe sore spots in both the Spinozist
    and Kantian ideas of reason in ‘‘The Radical Enlightenment: Theory, Power, Faith,’’ intheory &
    event(Spring 2004), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/tae/.


19. Bennett,Why We Fight, 100.


20. Strauss,Liberalism, Ancient and Modern, 228.


21. Talal Asad, ‘‘Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Reli-
    gion,’ ’’ inReligion and Media, ed. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (Stanford: Stanford University
    Press, 2001), 216.


22. Talal Asad,Formations of the Secular(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 38.


23. Ibid., 38–39.


24. Ibid., 55.


25. Ibid., 169.


26. Gyanandra Pandey, inSilencing the Present: History and the Homogenization of Contempo-
    rary India(Cambridge, forthcoming), applies a similar analysis and prescriptive orientation to the
    contemporary politics of India. He shows how the partition of Pakistan and India, organized around
    a religio-national imperative, intensified conflicts between Muslims and Hindus. And he pursues
    the possibility of a post-secular India that is pluralistic in shape.


27. As Johns Rawls puts it in one formulation, ‘‘We appeal to a political conception of justice
    to distinguish between those questions that can be reasonably removed from the political agenda

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