NOTES TO PAGES 300–305individual, which accord primacy to private individual liberty. Liberalism in this sense is not a
political position within liberal democracies but their groundwork.
- If national ‘‘civic religion’’ was featured by the classic social contract theorists—Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau—as a necessarysupplementto the social contract, where did the contents of
what was deposited in that supplement go, and what is the relationship of this loss to the rise of
subnational identities requiring civic tolerance? - Immanuel Kant, ‘‘What Is Enlightenment?’’ inPolitical Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 54. Kant, of course, also problematizes this very
formulation. - On Bush’s regular consultations with rapture Christians and the effects of these consulta-
tions on foreign policy, see Rick Perlstein, ‘‘The Jesus Landing Pad,’’ inThe Village Voice, May 18, - See also Bob Woodward’sPlan of Attack(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), in which
Bush responds to the question of whether he consulted his father before deciding to launch war on
Iraq: ‘‘You know he is the wrong father to appeal to in terms of strength. There is a higher father
that I appeal to’’ (94). Bush also told Woodward, ‘‘I believe the United States isthebeacon for
freedom in the world.... I say that freedom is not America’s gift to the world. Freedom is God’s
gift to everybody in the world.... And I believe we have a duty to free people’’ (88–89). - Chandran Kukathas is a significant exception in his argument that liberty of conscience and
autonomy are not only not equivalent but may well conflict at times. He argues that liberty of
conscience, not autonomy, is the basis of toleration and that liberty of conscience must trump
autonomy when they do conflict. See hisThe Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. chap. 1, 36–37. - Susan Mendus,Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities
Press, 1989), 56. - Will Kymlicka, ‘‘Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance’’ inToleration: An Elusive Virtue,
ed. David Heyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 97. - Bernard Williams, ‘‘Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?’’ inToleration, ed. Heyd, 24.
- Michael Ignatieff, ‘‘Nationalism and Toleration,’’ inThe Politics of Toleration, ed. Susan
Mendus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). - In his comments on my work at a symposium, Barry Hindess reminded me that the
temporalization of difference is an insidious and pervasive trope in Western political and social
thought, one that is not limited to liberalism or even to colonial discourse. Comment by Barry
Hindess at the Launch of the Center on Citizenship, Identity, and Governance, Open University,
Milton Keynes, England (March 2005). For an elaboration of this position, see the essay he co-
authored with Christine Helliwell, ‘‘The Temporalising of Difference,’’Ethnicities5, no. 3: 414–18. - See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff,Blood and Belonging(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995).
- Sigmund Freud,Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton,
1962); Freud,Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1952). - Sigmund Freud,Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. James Strachey (New
York: Norton, 1950). - The phrase ‘‘primary mutual hostility’’ appears in Freud,Civilization and Its Discontents,
69, and natural ‘‘sexual rivalry’’ inTotem and Taboo, 144. - Freud,Group Psychology, 68.
- Ibid., 13.
- Ibid., 12.
- Ibid., 24.
- Continued revelations about the deliberate development and approval of the techniques
of torture and abuse practiced at Abu-Ghraib, and their continuity with those practiced both at
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