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  1. See Gilles Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia
    University Press, 1994), 129.

  2. While Deleuze is much more explicit in his attack on Hegel and dialectics, as inNietzsche
    and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), Cavell’s
    mode of argumentation seeks to maintain tensions, rather than considering its end to be resolution
    in a ‘‘higher synthesis’’ or to sustain difference without turning it into contradiction or negation.
    See, esp., Cavell’s discussion of morality inThe Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality,
    and Tragedy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 247–329.

  3. For Deleuze on the ‘‘a-subjective’’ or ‘‘pre-individual,’’ see Gilles Deleuze,The Logic of
    Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia
    University Press, 1990). On a related conception of philosophy, see also Gilles Deleuze / Felix Guat-
    tari,What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, III (New York: Columbia
    University Press, 1996). For Cavell on the ‘‘achievement of the un-polemical,’’ see his essays on
    Emerson, in particular ‘‘Emerson’s Constitutional Amending: Reading ‘Fate,’ ’’ inEmerson’s Tran-
    scendental Etudes, 192–214.
    7.Expressionis a central problem for Deleuze, starting with his first published work,Expres-
    sionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), esp. in the
    injunction not to ask ifxrepresentsy, but how it ‘‘works’’ or what manner of forces it brings
    together. See also Deleuze,Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco
    (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). For Cavell, the problem of expression takes
    the form of his repeated evocations of language as a ‘‘bodying forth’’ or of a ‘‘pitch’’ of philosophy.
    In this regard, see Cavell’sPhilosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida(Oxford:
    Basil Blackwell, 1995) andA Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises(Cambridge: Harvard
    University Press, 1994).

  4. ‘‘Difference internal to being’’ is perhaps the central proposition of Deleuze’sDifference and
    Repetition, which may be read as a response to Heidegger’sBeing and Time. On this conceptual
    trajectory, see the sense of the ‘‘self ’’ in Cavell’sThe Claim of ReasonorA Pitch of Philosophy, or, in
    a different way, his proposition that ‘‘translation internal to a culture is as, if not more, difficult
    than that between cultures,’’ in ‘‘Emerson’s Constitutional Amending: Reading ‘Fate,’ ’’Emerson’s
    Transcendental Etudes, 210.

  5. On the internal relation of sense and non-sense, see Deleuze,The Logic of Sense, and Cavell’s
    essay ‘‘Wittgenstein and Benjamin: Signals and Affinities,’’Critical Inquiry25, no. 2. (Winter 1999):
    235–46.

  6. Immanence is one of the key themes throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre, from his conception of
    Spinoza as the preeminent philosopher of immanence to his final published essay, ‘‘Immanence: A
    Life,’’ inPure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001). In
    Cavell, immanence expresses itself in his constant preoccupation with the ‘‘ordinary,’’ or in his
    repeated assertion that Wittgenstein’s task is one of ‘‘leading words back from their metaphysical
    to their everyday use.’’ A synonym for Cavell’s usage of the termmetaphysical, in this case, would
    betranscendence.

  7. A comparison of Cavell’s and Deleuze’s work on cinema would be very interesting. In
    conceptualizing the relation between cinema and philosophy, both arrive at strikingly similar con-
    clusions regarding cinematic expression in the period after the Second World War. Compare, e.g.,
    Cavell, ‘‘End of the Myths,’’The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film(enlarged edition,
    Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 60–68, and Deleuze, ‘‘The Crisis of the Action-
    Image,’’Cinema I: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minne-
    apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 197–215, the bridge section to hisCinema II: The


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