NOTES TO PAGES 502–4therefore the law banning religious signs should not apply to it. In April 2004 the ministry accepted
the Sikh argument: the new law did not apply to ‘‘traditional costumes which testify to the attach-
ment of those who wear them to a culture or to a customary way of dressing’’(Luc Bronner,
‘‘Franc ̧ois Fillon propose son ‘mode d’emploi’ de la loi sur le voile,’’Le Monde, April 12, 2004).
This apparent exception was eventually voted down in August 2004 by the National Assembly, who
considered the ban to apply equally to the turban (but not to long hair) for Sikh men as an obvious
religious sign. There was never any question of examining the categorical opposition ofculturalto
religious; what mattered was where the turban was to be placed as a sign. This ambiguity was
resolved by law.
- ‘‘Dans le cadre laı ̈que, les choix spirituels ou religieux rele ́vent de la liberte ́individuelle:
cela ne signifie pas pour autant que ces questions soient confine ́es al’intimite ́de la conscience, ‘privatise ́es,’ et que leur soient de ́nie ́es tout dimension sociale ou capacite ́d’expression publique. La laı ̈cite ́distingue la libre expression spirituelle ou religieuse dans l’espace public, le ́gitime et essen- tielle au de ́bat de ́mocratique, de l’emprise sur celui-ci, qui est ille ́gitime. Les repre ́sentents des diffe ́rentes options spirituelles sont fonde ́sace titre dans le de ́bat public, comme toute composante
de la socie ́te ́[In the secular framework, religious or spiritual choices are a matter of individual
freedom, yet this does not mean that these questions should be confined to the privacy of con-
science, ‘privatized,’ and that they are denied all social dimensions or the possibility of public
expression. Secularism distinguishes free religious or spiritual expression in public space, which is
legitimate and essential to democratic debate, from control over the latter, which is illegitimate.
Representatives of the different spiritual options are thus entitled to take part in public debate, as
are all who make up society]’’ (Laı ̈cite ́et Re ́publique, 31). - Ghislaine Hudson, in an interview with a group of young people published as ‘‘Laı ̈cite ́:
Une loi ne ́cessaire ou dangereuse?’’Le Monde, December 11, 2003. - SeeLaı ̈cite ́et Re ́publique, 102–3.
- ‘‘After we heard the evidence, we concluded that we faced a difficult choice with respect
to young Muslim girls wearing the headscarf in state schools. Either we left the situation as it was,
and thus supported a situation that denied freedom of choice to those—the very large majority—
who do not want to wear the headscarf; or we endorsed a law that removed freedom of choice from
those who do want to wear it. We decided to give freedom of choice to the former during the time
they were in school, while the latter retain all their freedom for their life outside school’’ (Patrick
Weil, ‘‘A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims and the Headscarf ’’; http://www.opendemocracy.com,
March 25, 2004). - The Stasi report cites various international court judgments in support of its argument
that the right to religious expression is always subject to certain conditions (Laı ̈cite ́et Re ́publique,
47–50). My point here is not that this right—or any other—shouldbe absolute and unlimited; it is
simply that a rightcannotbe inalienable if it is subject (for whatever reason) to the superior power
of the state’s legal institutions to define and limit. To take away a right in part or in whole on
grounds of utility (including public order) or morality means that it is alienable. - ‘‘Le juge n’a pas cru pouvoir se prononcer sur l’interpre ́tation du sens des signes religieux;
il s’agit lad’une limite inhe ́rente al’intervention du juge: Il lui a semble ́impossible d’entrer dans
l’interpre ́tation donne ́e par une religion atel ou tel signe. Par conse ́quent, il n’a pu appre ́hender les discriminations entre l’homme et la femme, contraires aun principe fondamental de la Re ́publique,
que pouvait reveˆtir le port du voile par certaines jeunes filles [The judge did not believe he was able
to pronounce on the interpretation of the meaning of the religious signs. It was a matter of an
inherent limit to a judge’s intervention: it seemed to him impossible to enter into the interpretation
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