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NOTES TO PAGES 638–41

41. The remark ‘‘infinite’’ is in Foucault, ‘‘Useless to Revolt?’’ inPower, 452.


42. Foucault, ‘‘The Subject and Power,’’ ibid., 327.


43. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu-
    tics, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 241.


44. Foucault, ‘‘Omnes and Singulatim,’’Power, 307.


45. Foucault, ‘‘Useless to Revolt?’’ ibid., 449–53.


46. Foucault,The Order of Things,chap. 9, esp. 310–11.


47. Foucault, ‘‘The Order of Things,’’ inAesthetics, Method, and Epistemology,264.


48. Foucault,The Order of Things, 309.


49. Foucault notes, inThe Order of Things, that the creation of ‘‘man’’ in the modern era
    occurs at about the time of the death of God but is not recognized as such until much later, with
    Nietzsche and the rise of anthropology (and structuralism), to say the least (The Order of Things,
    342). It is significant that Foucault elsewhere suggests having taken up the ‘‘end of man’’ directly
    from Nietzsche and the space that he leaves open when he declares God to be dead (Foucault,
    Religion and Culture, 85). It is not the temporal connection between Nietzsche and the ‘‘modern
    age’’ that defines modern man, but rather man’s self-knowledge in its link to this opening.


50. Foucault,The Order of Things, 312.


51. Ibid., 313–15. Of course, the ‘‘analytic of finitude’’ is a Heideggerian theme, one of several
    I have alluded to here (e.g., the existential/epistemological, or, in Heidegger’s terms, existentiell/
    existential distinction targeted earlier). Though references to Heidegger are largely absent from
    Foucault’s texts, a thorough engagement with Heidegger is central not only to this motif but also
    to other issues throughoutThe Order of Things(esp. the section ‘‘The Analytic of Finitude,’’ 312–

18. and especiallyThe Archaeology of Knowledge. To expand upon this analysis is, however, beyond
    the scope of the present discussion.

52. Foucault,The Order of Things, 314, my emphasis.


53. Ibid., 264.


54. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 226.


55. Ibid., 204.


56. Ibid., 216, amended translation in brackets.


57. Ibid., 200, 202.


58. Ibid., 201.


59. Ibid., 317n.4.


60. Ibid., 206.


61. Consider, e.g., Rome’s Pantheon, which was later rededicated to the Virgin Mary; or the
    original dome of Constantinople’s Hagia Sophia, which appeared to be floating in the sky due to
    its separation from the main ceiling through the use of windows; or the (occasional) depiction in
    Orthodox churches of a decorporealized divine eye in the dome or the ceiling (‘‘sky’’) of the congre-
    gation area. See also Schmidt-Burkhardt, ‘‘The All-Seer.’’


62. Martin Jay hints at this but never treats it as a specific analytic behind the later Foucault’s
    theory of vision and power. See hisDowncast Eyes, 408.


63. Jay correctly notes that Foucault ‘‘resisted exploring’’ the potential ofle regardas a ‘‘recip-
    rocal, intersubjective, communicative’’ exchange (Downcast Eyes, 414–15). I would also point out
    that Foucault’s conception of vision is almost by definition univectoral, because of his powerful
    intent of founding it on scopic asymmetry and the fundamental potential absence of a determinable
    viewer ‘‘seeing the subject.’’ As such, the return of a gaze is but a different gaze, having the same
    (vis-a`-vis the first gaze, contrasting) power effects of such a singular, other gaze. In a mode that has
    reached considerable popularity through films likeThe ConversationandEnemy of the State, the

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