whereas task difficulty is believed to reduce it (ibid.). Unfortunately, the resource
metaphor of divided attention is somewhat simplistic. Thus Navon and Gopher (1979)
have argued that people may have multiple attentional resources rather than a single pool
of undifferentiated mental energy. Each of these multiple pools may have its own
functions and limits. For example, Schmidt and Lee (1999) discovered that the attentional
resources required for a motor skill such as selecting a finger movement may be separate
from those which regulate a verbal skill such as the pronunciation of a word. Although
intuitively appealing, multiple resource theories of attention have been criticised on the
grounds of being “inherently untestable” (Palmeri, 2002, p. 298). To explain, virtually
any pattern of task interference can be “explained” post hoc by attributing it to the
existence of multiple pools of attentional resources.
In general, cognitive models of attention, whether based on spotlight or resource
metaphors, have two major limitations. First, they have focused mainly on external (or
environmental) determinants of attention and have largely overlooked internal factors
(e.g., thoughts and feelings) which can distract athletes. For example, consider what
happened to Sonia O’Sullivan, the 2000 Olympic silver-medallist in the 5,000 m event in
Sydney, who allowed her concentration to slip in the 10,000 m race at the Games.
According to her post-event interview, the thought of the medal she had won prevented
her from focusing properly in the next race: “If I hadn’t already got a medal, I might have
fought a bit harder. But when you have a medal already, maybe you think about that
medal for a moment. It probably was only for a lap...but that is all it takes for a race to
get away from you” (cited in Curtis, 2000, p. 29). Of course, as we indicated in Chapter
1, athletes’ insights into their own mental processes are not always reliable or valid from
a researcher’s perspective. The second weakness of cognitive models of attention is that
they ignore the influence of emotional states. This neglect of the affective dimension of
behaviour is lamentable because it is widely known in sport psychology that anxiety
impairs attentional processes. For example, the phenomenon of choking under pressure
(whereby nervousness causes a sudden deterioration of athletic performance; see also
Chapter 3) illustrates how the beam of one’s attentional spotlight can be directed inwards
when it should be focused only on the task at hand. For a comprehensive account of the
role of emotional factors in sport, see Hanin (2000).
To summarise, this section of the chapter highlighted two important ideas. First,
concentration is just one aspect of the multidimensional construct of attention. In
particular, it refers to the ability to pay attention to the task at hand while ignoring
distractions from internal as well as external sources. In addition, despite their
plausibility, cognitive metaphors of attention have certain limitations which hamper
theories and research on concentration in athletes. Having sketched the nature of
concentration, let us now consider its importance for optimal athletic performance.
Importance of concentration in sportThe importance of concentration in sport is indicated by at least three sources of
evidence: anecdotal, descriptive and experimental (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of the
main research methods used in sport and exercise psychology).
First, as the anecdotal examples at the beginning of this chapter reveal so graphically,
many top athletes attest to the value of focusing skills in sport. To illustrate, Michael
Sport and exercise psychology: A critical introduction 98