Sport And Exercise Psychology: A Critical Introduction

actually react in the real-life situation being imagined. Interestingly, Lang (1977, 1979)
suggested that response propositions are modifiable. Therefore, based on this theory, it
should be possible to influence athletes’ mental practice by using imagery scripts that are
heavily laden with response propositions. Unfortunately, with the exception of studies by
researchers such as Bakker et al. (1996) and Hecker and Kaczor (1988), this hypothesis
has not been tested systematically in sport psychology. Nevertheless, there is some
evidence that imagery scripts emphasising response propositions elicit greater
physiological activation than do those containing stimulus propositions predominantly
(Lang, Kozak, Miller, Levin and McLean, 1980). This conclusion was supported by
Cremades (2002) who recorded the EEC activity of golfers during imagery of a putting
task using different types of visualisation scripts. Analysis of alpha activity in these
participants revealed that greater arousal and effort were needed during the golfers’
imagery emphasising response propositions as compared with that apparent during
imagery emphasising stimulus propositions.
In summary, according to bio-informational theory, imagery not only allows people to
rehearse what they would do in certain hypothetical situations but also leads to
measurable psychophysiological changes associated with the response and meaning
propositions triggered by the situation being imagined. Although this theory has not been
widely tested in sport and exercise psychology, it has at least three interesting
implications for MP research. First, it encourages researchers to regard imagery as more
than just a “picture in the head”. To explain, Lang’s (1977, 1979) theories postulate that
for MP to be effective, both stimulus and response propositions must be activated by the
imagery script used (Gould, Damarjian and Greenleaf, 2002). Second, it highlights the
value of “individualising” imagery scripts so that they take account of the personal
meaning which people attribute to the skills or movements that they wish to rehearse (see
also Holmes and Collins, 2002). Finally, bio-informational theory emphasises the need to
consider emotional factors when designing imagery scripts—an issue which has been
largely neglected by advocates of neuromuscular and cognitive theories of mental
practice. Interestingly, there is now compelling evidence that visualising a stimulus has
an effect on the body similar to that when actually seeing it. Thus Lang, Greenwald,
Bradley and Hamm (1993) discovered that people who imagine threatening objects
experience the same signs of emotional arousal (e.g., increased heart rate, shallow
breathing) as they do when actually looking at them.

An integrated model of mental practice: functional equivalence theory

Having considered the strengths and limitations of three traditional theories of mental
practice (namely, the neuromuscular, cognitive and bio-informational models), it may be
helpful to propose an integrated, compromise position which takes account of recent
neuropsychological research on mental imagery. Briefly, two key propositions underlying
this integrated position may be expressed as follows. First, neuroimaging studies suggest
that imagery is functionally equivalent to perception because these two types of cognitive
activity share similar neural pathways in the brain (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Second,
research indicates that mental practice is functionally equivalent to physical practice in
the sense that imagery is guided by the same kinds of central mental representations as
are motor movements (Hall, 2001). Evidence to support this proposition comes from

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