Sport And Exercise Psychology: A Critical Introduction

completely automated (Ericsson, 2001b). As yet, however, little research has been
conducted to test the proposition that experts can continue to improve their performance
beyond automaticity. Nevertheless, Ericsson’s theory purports to explain why most
recreational golfers and tennis players do not improve beyond a certain level in spite of
practising regularly: ‘The key challenge for aspiring expert performers is to avoid the
arrested development associated with automaticity that is seen with everyday activities
and, in addition, to acquire cognitive skills to support continued learning and
improvement of their performance” (Ericsson, 2001b, p. 12). Third, Ericsson’s theories
offer suggestions as to why continuous practice is so important to experts. Briefly, if elite
performers fail to practise continuously, they will lose the “feel” or kinaesthetic control
that guides their skills (see Ericsson, 2001b, p. 42). Fourth, Ericsson’s research on
expertise highlights the role of acquired knowledge rather than innate talent in shaping
top-level performance. Put simply, if someone can master the knowledge and skills
required for expertise, then expert performance should occur. On the other hand, Ericsson
concedes that there may well be individual differences in the degree to which people are
motivated to engage in deliberate practice. Nevertheless, a key theme of Ericsson’s
research is that expertise is inextricably linked to knowledge compilation. Fifth, research
on deliberate practice shows us that concentration is essential for optimal learning
(Ericsson, 2001b; see also Young and Salmela, 2002). Finally, the theory of deliberate
practice has some interesting implications for talent identification programmes
(Summers, 1999). For example, it suggests that instead of attempting to identify
precociously talented young performers, sports organisations may be better advised to
concentrate instead on searching for youngsters who display the types of psychological
qualities (e.g., dedication to practice, determination to improve) which are likely to
facilitate and sustain requisite regimes of deliberate practice.

Some criticisms of Ericsson’s theories

As one might expect of such an environmentalist approach, Ericsson’s theory of expertise
has aroused as much controversy as enthusiasm within sport psychology. The main
problem is that many coaches baulk at the claim that practice is more important than
innate talent in determining athletic success. Against this background, what are the
principal criticisms directed at Ericsson’s research on deliberate practice (see also Starkes
et al., 2001)?
At least six criticisms of Ericsson’s theories and research may be identified in sport
psychology. To begin with, the theory of deliberate practice has been criticised on the
grounds of invalid extrapolation from the field of music to that of sport. The argument
here is that there are important differences between these fields which Ericsson and his
colleagues may have neglected. For example, as we mentioned earlier, deliberate practice
is usually undertaken alone by musicians but in pairs or collectively in sport. As a result
of this contextual difference, the nature of the practice activities undertaken may differ
significantly. For example, the camaraderie generated among team-mates training
together may explain why athletes differ from musicians in their tendency to enjoy
performing basic practice drills in their specialist domain (see earlier discussion of this
issue). A second criticism of Ericsson’s theory is that it is based on evidence that is
correlational rather than experimental in nature. According to this argument, these data

Sport and exercise psychology: A critical introduction 178