13 Policy Matters.qxp

bouring states since their transboundary

nature implies being managed jointly by

two or more governments. However there

are multiple powerful actors, other than

national authorities, involved in the man-

agement of TBPAs – states and official

bodies operate in complex ways with NGOs

and other elements of civic society and pri-

vate enterprise at national, regional and

international scales.

Much is made of the potential for TBPAs to

operate as symbolic ‘Peace Parks’ which

will foster good political relations and secu-

rity through the encouragement of inter-

state collaboration and cooperation around

issues of common concern.^28 In the

African context the identification with

nature above nation ties in with Pan-

African visions of reuniting a continent arti-

ficially carved up by colonialism;^29 healing

the wounds of pre- and post-independence

wars of destabilisation;^30 and achieving the

‘cultural harmonisation’ of divided ethnic

groups (i.e. re-establishing cultural integri-

ty as well as ecological integrity).

However in the messy real world this post-

national symbolism runs up against diver-

gent national interests and agendas.

Indeed attempts to bind states into formal

transboundary conservation agreements

may be as likely to cause inter-state dis-

putes as to assuage them. This is particu-

larly true of situations where there are dif-

ferences in the economic

power of the partner

nation states and their

perceived ability to negoti-

ate their interests.

Asymmetries in the part-

ner states’ incomes,

degrees of park and infra-

structural development,

political stability and secu-

rity and available financial resources; as

well as diverging veterinary and immigra-

tion policies are all potential sources of dif-

ficulty.^31

It seems wistful thinking that TBPAs are

likely to be anything other than a very low

priority for governments in actual conflict

situations. It is worth remembering that

protracted disorder can actually foster the

interests of elite groups through the sub-

version of the interests and legitimacy of

state.^32 Such groups may resent and resist

the exposure to prying eyes of zones of

illegality (poaching etc) and more effective

law enforcement that TBPAs would bring.^33

Similarly whilst the re-establishment of his-

torical links where communities have been

divided by political borders imposed by

colonial powers is frequently promised, is it

likely, feasible or desirable that govern-

ments will be willing to cede power or ter-

ritory to ethnic groups spanning their bor-

ders?

Whilst states’ might be unwilling to give up

too much power to neighbouring states

TBPAs also involve ceding considerable

authority and decision making power to a

range of supra-national entities – such as

bilateral and multilateral donors, interna-

tional NGOs and multinational companies –

and sub-national entities which often by-

pass state authority structures. In particu-

lar powerful international conservation

NGOs and consultancy companies or ‘facili-

tating agencies’ often exercise considerable

power in collaborative management

arrangements.^34

Top-down or bottom up?

A final set of tensions inherent in the gov-

ernance of TBPAs that I want to explore

are those between top-down approaches

that prioritise conservation and/or cen-

tralised power and bottom-up approaches

prioritising local development. Are the voic-

es of the poor heard in ecoregional plan-

ning processes?

History, cculture aand cconservation

Attempts tto bbind
states iinto fformal
transboundary ccon-
servation aagree-
ments mmay bbe aas
likely tto ccause iinter-
state ddisputes aas tto
assuage tthem