ones.
The political ambiguity of the LUPCs made
many people evaluate them as morally
ambiguous. North Pare residents evaluate
the morality of development interventions
based on an egalitarian expectation that
benefits and limitations should be distributed
equally, which should theoretically lead to a
state of conflict-free ‘coolness.’ But village
LUPCs had the difficult task of regulating
land use within administrative units despite
the awkward fact that the social relations of
land use usually crossed administrative
boundaries. This meant that LUPC strategies
of coercion, use of shame, and weak threats
of legal action often led to jealousy and
resentment instead of compliance. For
example, one farmer I know was growing
taro in a spring that her village LUPC want-
ed protected. When she asked TFAP facilita-
tors if she could replace the taro with a per-
manent crop that would inhibit erosion (such
as fodder grass or fruit trees), they refused.
Her sense of injustice led her to perceive a
definite lack of ‘coolness’ in the protected
spring, so she believes that the spring is
bound to dry up. The ambiguities and con-
tradictions of the LUPCs therefore undercut
precisely the sort of locally legitimate politi-
cal and ecological order that they were
required to create.
Conclusions
Land Use Planning Committees were weak
in North Pare because the development
agency that mandated them ignored local
political processes and cultural norms. The
efficacy of these new techniques and new
institutions for community-based natural
resource management suffered because
TFAP’s technocratic management style pre-
vented communication of local needs, val-
ues, and expectations–the essence of grass-
roots participation. Second, terracing was a
feasible but problematic solution to land
degradation because it brings technical,
social, and moral problems for the farmers
who build terraces, and the development
agency was largely unaware of these prob-
lems. Third, the new social institutions cre-
ated to implement these solutions were not
genuinely participatory and usually lacked
the political authority and moral legitimacy
to effectively convince
farmers to use SWC
techniques. The result-
ing situation did com-
pel some farmers to
build terraces, but it
did not foster the
social harmony that
many in North Pare
hold as fundamental to
agricultural fertility,
improved land use,
and authentic develop-
ment.This case study of the
contradictions in com-
munity-based natural
resource management
suggests that a politi-
cal and cultural analy-
sisof the technical, social, and moral quan-
daries faced by resource users can illumi-
nate some of the pitfalls of the CBNRM
approach. This analytical framework is use-
ful as a forensic tool for picking apart proj-
ect failures, and does not provide a clear
and straight path through the thickets of
contradiction and ambiguity that CBNRM
entails. Land rights, economic responsibili-
ties, social processes, political contests, and
cultural values vary widely and harmonious
communities characterised by consensus
and conformity are very hard to find – which
therefore suggests that successful CBNRM
may not be readily transferable. The devolu-
tion of resource management authority to
community-level institutions is, however, one
of the best options for ameliorating the con-
tradictions of neo-liberal economic globalisa-
tion. If more planners and administrators
can avoid the conceptual assumptions of
sameness and unity built into the category
of ‘community,’ a more technically effective,Conservation aas ccultural aand ppolitical ppractice
a ppolitical aand ccultural
analysis oof tthe ttechni-
cal, ssocial, aand mmoral
quandaries ffaced bby
resource uusers [[is nneeded
to ]] iilluminate ssome oof
the ppitfalls oof tthe
CBNRM aapproach....
[yet]...the ddevolution oof
resource
management aauthority
to ccommunity-llevel
institutions [[remains]
one oof tthe bbest ooptions ffor
ameliorating tthe ccontra-
dictions oof nneo-lliberal
economic gglobalisation.