they complained that as these owners pur-
chased “days” they would bring in their own
crews to work these days thereby leave less
fishing opportunities for resident seiners.
This trend has only increased tension
between the beaches.Monitoring & Enforcement
Ostrom^16 has referred to monitoring and
enforcement as central to common prop-
erty management regimes. For measures
to be effective monitors should be
accountable to the appropriators or moni-
toring should be carried out by the appro-
priators themselves.^17 In Arraial do Cabo
actions have historically been held in
check by a variety of monitoring mecha-
nisms. Many changes, including the con-
centration of ownership of both access to
the fishing grounds and of gear used,
have significantly altered the reliability of
the monitoring system of this regime and
some of these are no longer practiced.
Others are still used on some beaches and
not on others. Traditionally, each compan-
hawas required to have a monitor among
the crew who was responsible for observ-
ing the activities, and reporting irregulari-
ties and infractions to the local fishing
association.^18 This meant that the associa-
tion itself was involved in sanctioning
canoes or owners who did not comply.
Sanctions were gradual,
but severe, and initial
infractions were fined
with subsequent ones
leading to the exclusion
of that canoe from the
sequence. Fines were
then invested in educa-
tion and medical servic-
es in support of fishers
and their families.The most effective tool
for monitoring access is
still in use by all beaches and is inherent
in the sequence itself. Because each com-panha has an interest in and incentive to
protect its ‘day’ and right to fish, the
group will naturally ensure that other
canoes comply with the system. For
example, if a companhaarrives on the
beach on their fishing day and there is a
canoe out of sequence already there, the
companha that has the customary right to
fish will fight to protect and maintain it.It is not just the sequence, though, that
provides these sorts of incentives. For the
most part, unlike other fishing types, sein-
ing takes place in very accessible and
public spaces. Because this fishery is such
an intrinsic part of the local livelihoods
and shared cabistaidentity, it is not just
the fishers who know the rules. Canoe
fishing is a spectacle that locals (including
other types of fishermen) like to watch
and participate in. Observers consist of
fishers and non-fishers alike and they too
play a role in supporting the system,
including an awareness of who is and who
is not upholding the rules.Nevertheless, there are a number of major
infractions occurring, particularly on Praia
Grande, that are not being addressed.
Powerful individuals with vested interests
in the institutional arrangements that gov-
ern this fishery have pursued a policy of
selective rule enforcement that protects
their control over the system and minimis-
es their investment. For example, there
are significantly fewer gear sets (canoe
and net) than there are days (e.g., there
are approximately fifteen canoes/nets
when there should be forty-two). In the
past, this would not have been possible as
each day was owned by a different set of
individuals and the rules stipulated that
each day would have a distinct set of gear
associated with it. Therefore, a beach with
12 fishing days would have 12 canoes,
nets, etc. Owners without fishing gear (or
gear being repaired) would not be able to
participate in the fishery. Overtime, a fewConservation aas ccultural aand ppolitical ppractice
Traditionally, eeach
companha wwas
required tto hhave aa
monitor aamong tthe
crew wwho wwas rrespon-
sible ffor oobserving
the aactivities, aand
reporting iirregulari-
ties aand iinfractions
to tthe llocal ffishing
association