Re-Thinking the Place of Semiotics in Psychology... 129holes" (Gombrich, 1963, p. 44; cf. Ehrenzweig, 1953/1965). He points out that we are always
most comfortable when the new and unfamiliar bears resemblance to the old and familiar; the
first railway carriages were made to look like stagecoaches, and the first electric lights like
candelabras. In addition, "All art is 'image-making' and all image-making is rooted in the
creation of substitutes" (Gombrich, 1963, p. 9). With respect to the nature of the substitution,
the stronger the motivation, the less stringent the requirement for formal similarity. Indeed,
similarity of function can be more compelling than similarity of form: "substitutes reach deep
into biological functions that are common to man and animals - a child ... will reject a
perfectly naturalistic doll in favour of a monstrously abstract dummy which is 'cuddly'"
(Gombrich, 1963, p. 4).
Of course, in conceptual metaphor, just as in nonconventional symbolism, there is, by
definition, no deliberate selection for communicative or indicative use, as there is in the
Peircean concept of icon. Nevertheless, like expressive symptoms (e.g., blushing) and natural
indices (e.g., footsteps in the sand), nonconventional symbolism is naturally indicative and
thus incidentally or inadvertently communicative; it can be "read" on analogy with
communications that are deliberately made. Thus, iconicity in the Peircean sense is the link
between conceptual metaphor and nonconventional symbolism, and justifies the inclusion of
the latter within a classification of semiotic phenomena. More importantly, the unification of
these two fields offers a rich and promising source of material for dealing with the kinds of
meaning phenomena (metaphor, art, music, dance, nonverbal communication, creativity, etc.)
that are beginning to find a place in mainstream psychology as legitimate subjects for
investigation. This raises the question of the appropriate methods for such investigations, and
leads into the final contribution of a realist semiotics-psychology integration.
Promoting Increased Methodological Sophistication by Underscoring the
Scientific Legitimacy of Nonquantitative Methods
With respect to the question of method, it is the qualifier ―realist‖ in the semiotics-
psychology integration that prepares the way. It does this via two steps. First, realism exposes
the scientific inappropriateness of mainstream psychology‘s exclusive preoccupation with
quantitative methods. Secondly, by extricating qualitative methods from their typical
antirealist and antiscientific metatheoretical contexts, realism resolves the problem of the so-
called "crisis" or "dilemma" of qualitative methods. Once these two steps have been taken,
the "semiotics" part of a realist semiotics-psychology integration takes over. Incorporating
semiotics not only underscores the scientific legitimacy of nonquantitative methods, but also
directs psychology‘s attention to the development of specific methods appropriate for the
many different types of nonquantitative, including semiotic, phenomena.
Let me consider the first preparatory step, that of how realism exposes the
inappropriateness of psychology's exclusive concern with quantitative methods. I mentioned
earlier that mainstream psychology's combination of scientific practicalism and
metatheoretical confusion has resulted in measurement and quantitative practices that are at
odds with the realism to which psychology is explicitly committed. They are also at odds with
the realism of those natural sciences (e.g., physics) that psychology attempts to follow. This
theme has been most thoroughly and cogently explored in the work of Joel Michell over the
last decade or so (e.g., Michell, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2009, 2010). To