Re-Thinking the Place of Semiotics in Psychology... 133emerged as the ―crisis of representation‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) or the ―dilemma of
qualitative method‖ (Hammersley, 1989). This crisis is the assumption that qualitative
researchers can directly capture the "lived experience" of their participants, as it is naturally,
while simultaneously being committed to an antirealist philosophy which rejects naturalism.
Similarly, what Hammersley (1989) labelled the "dilemma of qualitative method" is described
as "its simultaneous commitment, on the one hand to realism and science (by claiming to
reflect objectively the participants' accounts and perspectives) and, on the other hand, to
constructionism through a recognition of the multiple perspectives and subjectivities"
(Pidgeon, 1996, pp. 80-1). Of course, the real basis of this crisis lies in tension between
implict methodological realism and explicit philosophical antirealism.
Let me illustrate this tension from the qualitative literature itself. On the one hand, within
the qualitative movement, antirealism is the central explicit tenet in the broad philosophical
approaches (the ―paradigms‖ (Lincoln & Guba, 2000) or ―axiomatic positions‖ (W. Potter,
1996) of social constructionism, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics,
structuralism, post-structuralism, ethogenics, etc.). Realism and objectivism are explicitly
rejected in the statements of philosophical or ideological approach. For example, according to
J. Potter (1996), the single family resemblance across qualitative approaches is the fact that
―they all tend to be oppositional movements of one kind or another to traditional social
science positions, and, in particular, to their realist assumptions‖ (p. 127, emphasis added).
We are told that meanings cannot exist independently of the interpreter, interpretations
provide not truth but perspective, meanings are negotiated mutually in the act of
interpretation, rather than discovered, and there is never a finally correct interpretation.
On the other hand, these principles are gainsaid, and realism and objectivism are
implicitly assumed, as soon as the specific qualitative techniques and methods are employed
in the research (grounded theory, discourse analysis, ethnography, participant observation,
protocol analysis, case study, narrative analysis, etc.). Thus, for example, while the
―procrustean‖ quantitative ―psychometric trinity‖ of validity, generalizability and reliability is
explicitly criticised and rejected, nevertheless, there are qualitative versions of these same
concepts, such as credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity),
dependability (reliability), confirmability (objectivity) (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The aim of
qualitative techniques is to ―uncover the meanings of events in individuals‘ lives‖ (Janesick,
2000, p. 394, emphasis added), and to do so in such a way as to not ―overwrite internally
structured subjectivities with a-priori systems of meaning, as occurs, for example, with
standard survey instruments‖ (Henwood, 1996, p. 27). According to Flick (2002), discussions
in qualitative research are "motivated by the aim to do more justice to the objects of research
than is possible in quantitative research" (p. 8). In sum, "the whole philosophy of much
qualitative research is founded upon an explicit move towards increased validity" (Pidgeon,
1996, p. 84). Not only is the aim increased validity, but also possible biases (which
themselves would be inconceivable if there were nothing there to distort) must be carefully
monitored, and qualitative versions of validity checks must be applied (cf. Flick, 2002; Stiles,
1993). That is, ―a person involved in studying a phenomenon qualitatively must be sure that
the data represent the phenomenon of interest‖ (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 39, emphasis
added).
The incoherence that results from this tension is illustrated in the statement by Lincoln
and Guba (2000):