Afterword
J.J.C. Smart and J.J. Haldane
In our debate we argue on opposite sides of the issue of atheism and theism.
For a philosophical debate to be of any value, however, there must be a fair
basis of philosophical agreement notwithstanding the differences that are
there at the outset or those that may develop later. Neither of us would find
it as easy to have a profitable exchange with (say) a French deconstructionist
or a dogmatically unargumentative and obscure Whiteheadian.^1
One important point of agreement between us is in some aspects of philoso-
phical methodology. As has been emphasized, we are both metaphysical realists:
that is, we both believe in a real world independent of our human concerns
and categories. Our realism is not that of neo-pragmatists such as Hilary
Putnam who speak of ‘realism with a human face’. Notwithstanding that we
acknowledge the concerns and philosophical ingenuity lying behind such a
view we both believe in the existence of a reality independent of thought and
language and in the possibility of discovering something of the structure of
the world as it is in itself. Elsewhere Smart has written of ‘realism with a
cosmic face’^2 and Haldane of ‘humanism with a realist face’;^3 each in his own
way taking issue with Putnam’s position, though in Haldane’s case paying
attention to the concern to find a place for the human ‘life-world’ in the
metaphysical scheme of things.
Putnam’s rejection of metaphysical realism is not so extreme as that of
some contemporary analytical philosophers. For example, Michael Dummett
(who, like Haldane, is a Roman Catholic) and Crispin Wright have at times
advanced an account of meaning and understanding according to which we
can attach no sense to claims involving unrestricted spatial or temporal gener-
alizations, descriptions of the distant past and conjectures about the mental
states of others.^4 In contrast we both wish to say that there is such a fact of
the matter as (to revert to a theme in our earlier exchange) whether Jesus lost