198 J.J.C. Smart
5
Further Reflections
on Atheism for the
Second Edition
J.J.C. Smart
1 Preliminary
It was suggested that these remarks should not be part of a further exchange
between John Haldane and myself, but that we independently consider addi-
tional matters in the light of reviews of the first edition. However, it is not
practicable or desirable to consider reviews in detail. In passing I should like
to express my appreciation of the friendly tone of most reviews, and also
thanks to the more hostile reviewers for their stimulus to thought. I shall refer
to the first edition of this book as reprinted here by the abbreviation ‘FE’.
First of all, I admit to a certain lack of focus. In a debate on Atheism
and Theism this is perhaps inevitable, since the concept of God is a family
resemblance one (see FE p. 8) and so there may be as many atheisms as
theisms. I shall be concerned with the concept of God as a necessary being,
and consequently will say more about whether there is an intelligible sense of
‘necessary’ that is appropriate here. It has also been objected that I discuss
Descartes’ form of the ontological argument, in which God is defined as a
being with all perfections, and ignore what are held to be the more subtle
arguments of Anselm. Descartes, it will be remembered, made the mistake of
treating existence as a perfection (and hence as a property), whereas Anselm
was concerned with necessary existence as an attribute of God. Anselm’s
arguments are complex and indeed subtle, and there is a good deal of contro-
versy in the interpretation of them. It has been said that the resources of
contemporary modal logic make us better able to state Anselm’s argument in
a defensible way. So I shall say a little about Anselm which will lead on to
Atheism and Theism, Second Edition
J.J.C. Smart, J.J. Haldane
Copyright © J.J.C. Smart and J.J. Haldane, 1996, 2003