48 J.J.C. Smart
probability of its occurrence will still be infinite. So it is prudent to embrace
the religious life.^85
As I have suggested, one thing wrong with the argument is precisely in the
supposition that there are only the two options. Pascal could compare only
those options that were live for him, but options might be live for us though
not for Pascal. Furthermore Pascal makes the assumption that the only altern-
ative to atheism is Catholicism with its additional doctrines of heaven and
hell. These assumptions could be questioned and we could shed doubt on the
factual assumptions behind the argument.
One assumption of Pascal’s argument is of the existence of an afterlife and
of the possibility of eternal damnation if we reject the Christian religion,
perhaps even just its Catholic version. But maybe it is some other religion
that will be rewarded by God. Just as conceivable as Pascal’s assumption, as
Antony Flew has remarked, is that ‘there is a hidden God who will consign
all and only Catholics to the fate they so easily approve for others’.^86 (Still
it might be judged much less probable than the orthodox belief – if so the
argument could perhaps be sound.) Similarly, as William James remarked,
there might be a Deity, who took ‘particular pleasure in cutting off believers
of this pattern [i.e. on the basis of Pascal’s Wager] from their infinite
reward’.^87
Modern views about hell fire, even in the Catholic church, though not
in some Protestant sects, and certainly in the Church of England whose
theology becomes more and more indefinite in other ways as well, have
softened considerably. If God is not only omnipotent and omniscient but also
benevolent he would surely not consign people to hell fire. Of course the
doctrine of hell fire is often regarded as mythical, implying only the pains
of guilty feelings and alienation from God. We could raise the question of
whether an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God would allow even
these pains. Furthermore literal belief in an afterlife at all has weakened
among many Christians. In evaluating the argument I have set aside these
softening considerations. It seems that even on its own terms the argument of
Pascal’s Wager has the flaw of unconsidered assumptions, and with these
assumptions added there is too much indeterminacy with opposing positive
and negative infinities to be balanced up.
The argument of Pascal’s Wager is an example of a pragmatic argument
for belief. The argument is that belief is useful, not that it is true. Though
Pascal’s argument is flawed and in any case is stated in terms that do not
appeal to the contemporary theological mind, similarly pragmatic arguments
suggest themselves. If belief (in God or in some particular religious system in
detail) makes us happier, why should we not try to inculcate it into ourselves,
if necessary by non-rational means? A friend of mine, an exceptionally admir-
able philosopher of long-standing positivist bent, said to me that it was a