62 J.J.C. Smart
well as of course many benefits. There is something in the notion of original
sin, but I think that this should be thought of in terms of the defectiveness
of our genetic endowment. Thus, as I already mentioned, pugnacity may have
been much more appropriate in a prehistoric tribal environment and the
genes for it may have been selected, but it is very inappropriate to a contem-
porary situation in which opposing nations have deadly weapons. Also many
harmful genes or combinations of genes have been due to mutations or to
recombinations and have not yet been weeded out by natural selection.
Natural evils thus provide a formidable difficulty for the free will defence.
They have nothing to do with free will. It is true that some philosophers
and theologians have put down the existence of natural evils to the free and
malevolent choices of fallen angels. Such an explanation smacks of being ad
hoc and it is thoroughly implausible. There are perfectly naturalistic explana-
tions of the mutations of influenza viruses, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves and
other disastrous things or events.
I now want to go on to say that even if we ignore natural evils the free
will defence does not work. This is because an omnipotent, omniscient and
benevolent being would make a universe in which everyone chose in a morally
perfect manner. It might be that with the best will in the world a person
might act wrongly because of imperfect knowledge of cause and effect (con-
sequences of action) but at least God could have created beings without
positive wickedness. Or perhaps God could have created a world of both
bodily and spiritually incorruptible angels who would exercise their free
will in purely intellectual or aesthetic choices which were such that bad con-
sequences were impossible. This seems possible even on a libertarian or
indeterministic theory of free will.
Even in a world such as ours where bad consequences may occur through
lack of knowledge, free but wicked choices might be impossible. God could
have created beings with purely moral desires, from which they would always
act. Even on a libertarian theory of free will it is logically possible that
everyone would always in fact act rightly. God, who surveys all time and
space, could have created such a world.
If this is thought to be a contentious assertion, I can go on to say that this
idea of a universe with all indeterministic choices being right is not necessary
for my argument. This is because I will not grant the theist the notion of
libertarian free will, which seems to me to be an absurd one. Let me explain.
I hold that any sensible notion of free will is compatible with determinism.
Indeed one could go further and say with R.E. Hobart, in a famous essay,^103
that not only is determinism compatiblewith free will but that at least a fair
approximation to determinism is necessary for there to befree will. Of course,
as Hobart recognized, modern physics is indeterministic, but approximates
to determinism on the macro-level. Our nervous system is susceptible of