The Economist - USA (2021-12-18)

The Economist December 18th 2021 Holidayessay 33

MrPutin’sreturntothepresidencyin 2012 cameata timewhen

theglobalfinancialcrisishadchokedtheRussianeconomy.The

riggingofRussia’sparliamentaryelectionstheyearbefore,and

theprospectofMrPutin’sreturn,hadseentensofthousandstake

tothestreets. AndtheWest,spookedbytheincreasedbelligerence

RussiahadshowninGeorgia,wastakinga keeninterestinUk­

raine.Theeuofferedthecountryanassociationagreementwhich

wouldallowUkrainianstoenjoythebenefitsofa deepandcom­

prehensivefree­tradeagreementandfreetravelacrossEurope.

Ayearearliera groupofeconomistshadtoldMrPutinthata

customsunionwithUkrainewouldbea smartmove.Whatwas

more,sucha dealwouldprecludeUkraine’sassociationwiththe

eu. Pursuingit wasthusa wayforMrPutintoachievethreethings

atonce:pushbackagainsttheWest;giveRussiaa victorythat

wouldproveitsimportance;andhelptheeconomy.

TimeforsomeSlavicunity.WhenMrPutinflewtoKyivfora

two­dayvisitinJuly2013,hisentouragecontainedbothhischief

economicadviserandthepatriarchofRussia’sOrthodoxChurch,

whosejurisdictioncoveredbothcountries. Thetripcoincided

withthe1,025thanniversaryoftheconversiontoChristianityof

PrinceVladimiroftheKyivanRus,andsubsequentlyofthepeople

asa whole,in988:the“BaptismofRus”.WithMrYanukovychhe

visitedthecathedralinChersonesus,thesiteinCrimeawhere

PrinceVladimirissaidtohavebeenbap­

tised.HeandthepatriarchalsovisitedKyiv

PecherskLavra,amonasteryfoundedin

cavesa millenniumago.

Thecommitmenthegavetheretopro­

tecting “our common Fatherland, Great

Rus”wasnotwithoutirony.Whenin 1674

monksattheLavrapublishedthe“Synop­

sis”,thefirstdemotichistoryofRussia,the

citywasunderthreatofattackbytheOtto­

manempireanddesperatelyneededsup­

portfromtheRussianlandstothenorth.

The“Synopsis”soughttoencourageSlavic

solidaritybystressingtheimportanceof

VladimirandhisvirtuousKyivanRusto

KyivandMuscovyalike—somethinghisto­

rianslikeMrPlokhynowseeasexpedient

mythmaking.MrPutinwascynicallymin­

ing a mythos itself contrived for political ends. 

Mr Yanukovych did not want to be Russia’s vassal. Nor did he

share  western  Europe’s  values—especially  when  applied  to  mat­

ters of anti­corruption. But eventually he had to choose a side. At a

secret meeting in Moscow in November 2013, as European leaders

were  preparing  to  sign  their  agreement  with  Ukraine,  he  was

promised a $15bn credit line with $3bn paid up front. He ditched

the European deal. And at 4am on November 30thhis goons blud­

geoned a few dozen students protesting against his betrayal in Ky­

iv’s Independence Square, known as Maidan. 

By “turning into Lukashenko”, as one journalist put it, Mr Ya­

nukovych crystallised the choice facing Ukraine: dignity? Or sub­

servience?  Tents  sprang  up  on  Maidan.  Volunteers  distributed

food and clothes. Oligarchs, afraid that a deal with Russia would

see their ill­gotten gains stolen from them, tried to restrain Mr Ya­

nukovych.  Mr  Putin  pressed  him  to  use  force.  Mr  Yanukovych

dithered until, on February 18th, Kyiv went up in flames. Nobody

agrees on who fired the first shot. But by the third day of violence

around 130 people were dead, mostly on the protesters’ side, and

Mr Yanukovych—to everyone’s surprise—had fled Kyiv. 

This was far worse, for Mr Putin, than the Orange revolution.

Ukraine had made geopolitical reality, to coin a phrase, of the in­

dependence  it  had  claimed  two  decades  before.  Its  demands  for

dignity resonated with Russia’s middle class and some of its elite,

making  it  a  genuinely  dangerous  example.  So  Mr  Putin  annexed

Crimea and started a war in Donbas. 

economy was a condition for freedom, not a substituteforit.His
successor, Vladimir Putin, also embraced capitalism.Buthesaw
no need for it to bring freedom with it, and hadnoproblemwitha
state  run  through  repression  and  lies.  He  thusreversedYeltsin’s
democratic project and, though not at first territoriallyimperialist
himself, took the country down the other side ofBrzezinski’sfork.
It is that which puts Russia and its Slavic neighboursinsucha par­
lous position today.
One  of  Brzezinski’s  problems  with  Yeltsin’sRussiawas“that
the emerging capitalist class in Russia is strikinglyparasitic”.By
the time Mr Putin became president in 2000 Russiawasrunbyan
oligarchic elite which saw the state as a source ofpersonalenrich­
ment. But when pollsters asked people what theyexpectedoftheir
incoming president, reducing this corruption wasnottheirhigh­
est  priority.  The  standing  of  the  state  was.  Russianswanted a
strong  state  and  one  respected  abroad.  As  MrPutin’ssuccessful
manifesto put it, “A strong state is not an anomalytofightagainst.
Society  desires  the  restoration  of  the  guiding,organisingroleof
the state.” When, shortly after his election, MrPutinrestoredthe
Soviet anthem, it was not as a symbol of revertingtocentralplan­
ning or rebuilding an empire. It was a signal thatthestrongstate
was back. State power did not mean the rule oflawora climateof
fairness.  It  did  not  have,  or  need,  an  ideology. Butitdidhaveto
take  on  some  of  the  “geopolitical  reality”
that  the  meeting  in  Viskuli  had  stripped
from the Soviet Union. 
The strong state which provided an ef­
fective cover for kleptocracy in Mr Putin’s
Russia was not an option for Mr Kuchma’s
similarly oligarchic Ukraine. It had no real
history as a state, let alone a strong one. Its
national myth was one of Cossacks riding
free. So in Ukraine the stealing was instead
dressed  up  in  terms  of  growing  into  that
distinctive  national  identity.  The  essence
of  the  argument  was  simple.  As  Mr  Kuch­
ma put it in a book published in 2003, “Uk­
raine is not Russia”. 
This was not an attack on Russia. Ukrai­
nians liked Russia. Polls showed that they
admired  Mr  Putin  more  than  they  did  Mr
Kuchma. It was just a way of defining things that put the nation
first. And Mr Putin had no problem with it. Ukraine might not be
Russia, but it was not significantly different from Russia, let alone
threateningly so. It was just a bit more corrupt and chaotic. 
The  degree  to  which  Ukraine  was  not  Russia  became  clearer,
though,  in  2004,  when  a  rigged  presidential  election  saw  hun­
dreds  of  thousands  of  Ukrainians  protesting  in  the  streets.  Mr
Kuchma could have used force against them; Mr Putin encouraged
him to do so. But various considerations, including Western op­
probrium,  argued  against  it.  Perhaps  most  fundamental  was  his
sense that, as a Ukrainian president, he could not thus divide the
Ukrainian nation. He stayed his hand and allowed a second vote.
Viktor  Yushchenko,  pro­Western  and  Ukrainian­speaking,  beat
Viktor Yanukovych, a corrupt thug from Donbas (the easternmost
part of the country and, save Crimea, the most ethnically Russian)
who had claimed victory the first time round. The “Orange revolu­
tion”, as the protest came to be known, was a serious setback for
Mr Putin—all the more so when a similar uprising in Georgia, the
Rose revolution, put another pro­Western state on his borders. 
In 2008 Mr Putin took a constitutionally enforced break from
the  presidency,  swapping  jobs  with  Dmitri  Medvedev,  his  prime
minister. The shift did not stop him from overseeing a war against
Georgia that summer. In 2010, though, the Orange revolution be­
came, in retrospect, a somewhat Pyrrhic victory. Mr Yushchenko
proved a sufficiently poor president that in 2010 Mr Yanukovych
was able to beat him in a free and fair election. 

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