Aristotle on melancholy 145
of association from being disturbed by other bodily movements. Theeu-
thuoneiriaof melancholics (referred to here aseustochia, ability to make
the right conjecture, which suggests a greater degree of activity)^27 seems to
be based on the ability to ‘perceive similarities’ (1
!# ) );
on other occasions Aristotle relates this ability to a special natural disposi-
tion (phusisoreuphuia) and considers it an important principle for poetry
and philosophy.^28 Aristotle’s explanation of the prophetic dreams of melan-
cholics is therefore in line with his remark inMem. 453 a 15 (quoted above).
It is difficult to see how these statements can be reconciled withInsomn.
461 a 22 – 3. In this passage Aristotle brackets melancholics together with
the feverish and the intoxicated as examples of people who see confused
and monstrous images in their sleep and whose dreams themselves are not
coherent (( ) ). The cause of this blurriness is that all these affec-
tions contain air ( #) and therefore produce much movement
and confusion.^29 It is clear that these remarks are in stark contrast with the
characterisation of melancholics as ‘having clear dreams’ (euthuoneiroi)in
Div. somn. 463 b 15 – 17 and as ‘hitting the mark’ (eustochoi)in 464 a 33 ,
where the clear dreams of the melancholics are explained as a result of their
sensitivity to ‘being subjected to many and manifold movements’!
Given the close connection between both treatises (Div. somn. 464 b
9 – 10 even refers toInsomn. 461 a 14 ff., i.e. to the direct context of the
passage on melancholics), it is highly unlikely that Aristotle was unaware
of this contradiction. To solve this problem, B. Effe ( 1970 , 85 n. 49 ) has
suggested a different interpretation of the wordeuthuoneiros: not ‘dream-
ing clearly’, but ‘dreaming rightly’, that is to say, ‘dreaming the truth’. Yet
even if this interpretation ofeuthuoneirosis adopted, it remains impos-
sible to square Aristotle’s remark inInsomn. 461 a 22 – 3 (with its context
of distortion of images in dreams)^30 with the possibility to dream rightly.
(^27) To interpret the difference between the two passages as an antithesis between passive susceptibility
and active seeking is to a certain extent misleading, for this more active ability also escapes conscious
rational control (cf.Mem. 453 a 14 ff., in which the word # -
is used, but with the explicit note
that recollection in these people is ‘beyond their control’,( ’( L. The ‘daemonic’ nature
of the effect of the humanphusisactually consists in the fact that it escapes rational control, i.e. it
is( ’8 (cf.Somn. vig. 453 b 23 – 4 ;Eth. Nic. 1179 b 21 ff.)
(^28464) b 1 :
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3 !)> 464 b 7 explicitly mentions the perception
of similaritiesK3 1
!# ) L, but the purpose of this passage is to portray the ability
of the interpreter of dreams to determine the resemblance between dream and reality in cases in
which the dreams are not actually clear. See below (section 6 ) for the significance of this principle
in Aristotle’s views on cognitive psychology.
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