MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

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162 Aristotle and his school

to use it as a starting point for a discussion on the instability (anomalia ̄ )of

the melancholic nature rather than for any other purpose.^79 In addition,

the text explicitly states that the physiological balance which forms the basis

of extraordinary achievements is uncertain and unstable.^80 These two facts

underline the exceptional nature of the melancholicperitton; they clearly

show that this notion was apparently considered a negligible factor and as

such played no part in Aristotle’s theory of virtue, and as a philosophically

insignificant empirical phenomenon was only discussed in a text such as

theProblemata.^81

The fact that the medical observations that are so typical of theProb-

lemataare absent from Aristotle’s statements on melancholics and the fact

that Aristotle only discusses the ‘manic’ or ‘passionate’ expressions of melan-

choly (Flashar ( 1962 ) 713 ) therefore do not, in my opinion, have any impli-

cation for the relationship between Aristotle andPr. 30. 1. The difference

in objectives between these texts, and in particular Aristotle’s fundamen-

tally limited interest in medical issues in his works on natural science (and

a fortiorithose on ethics), seem largely to explain this lack of balance or

at least make it understandable. In Aristotle’s work, the number of pas-

sages in which the ‘manic’ expressions of the melancholic nature are worth

mentioning as illustrative examples (for instance contexts that mention its

sensitivity to desires and passions) outnumber the passages that would be

suitable for mentioning its ‘depressive’ manifestations. On a total of nine

occurrences, this might prove a sufficient explanation. In addition, it should

be noted that Aristotle fully takes into account the effects of cold that are

typical to melancholy, as is shown inSomn. vig. 457 a 31 (i.e. disregarding

Mag. mor. 1203 b 1 , which is probably not written by Aristotle and therefore

does not constitute proof ).

The most important reason for any irreconcilability between Aristotle’s

view on melancholy and the theory presented inPr. 30. 1 has so far been

given little attention by scholars. This reason would be that Aristotle denies

(^79) This observation is very much in accordance with the fact that the structure of the text differs greatly
from the otherProblemata. Similarly, it fits in well with the suggestion (see Flashar ( 1962 ) 711 , 714 ;
Flashar ( 1966 ) 61 ;Muri ( ̈ 1953 ) 21 ) that this chapter consists of an editorial combination of a typical
Problemataquestion and an excerpt of a treatise on melancholy, in which answering the question
posed at the start of the chapter was perhaps not the main objective of the author. For a different
explanation for the structure of this chapter see section 7 below.
(^80) Tellenbach ( 1961 , 9 ) correctly states that theseperittoiare characterised by an above-average instability.
(^81) In this respect theperittonof melancholics can be compared to the phenomenon ofeutuchia,
discussed inEth. Eud. 8. 2 (see ch. 8 below), with divination in sleep as discussed inOn Divination in
Sleep(see ch. 6 below) [and theperittonmentioned inPart. an. 4. 10 , 686 b 26 ]. Although Aristotle
considers both to be results of experience, they play no part in his ethics and psychology, perhaps
because of their uncontrollable nature and instability.

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