Aristotle on the matter of mind 209
not completely reducible to the study of nature. His consideration of the –
perhaps no more than potential – existence of ‘affections that are peculiar
to the soul’KA
:LinDe an. 1. 1 andPart. an. 1. 1 does suggest
that there are areas, or at least aspects, of the study of the soul which biology
does not cover (because no bodily factor appears to be involved).^11 Thus
the assumption thatOn the Soulis, in fact, a biological treatise becomes
problematic when one considers that it contains an extended, although
notoriously sketchy, discussion of thinking ($, 3. 4 – 8 ); forifthinking is
really a non-physical process – an issue on which Aristotle’s remarks are ten-
tative and not always quite clear^12 – one would rather expect its treatment
to belong somewhere else, for example in theMetaphysics.
Likewise unclear is the status of theParva naturalia, which seem to oc-
cupy a kind of middle position betweenOn the Souland the zoological
works and which, as a result, have traditionally, although rather unfortu-
nately, been divided into a ‘psychological’ and a ‘biological’ section.^13 Their
subject matter is intriguingly defined by Aristotle as ‘the affections that are
common to the soul and the body’^14 – which, again, at leastsuggeststhe
existence of affectionspeculiarto the soul, just like affections peculiar to
thebody, such as diseases.
Hence it would perhaps be more appropriate to say that for Aristotle
psychology and biology, as far as their subject matter is concerned, overlap
(^11) De an. 402 a 9 ; 403 a 8 ff.;Part. an. 641 a 32 -b 10. Cf. Frede ( 1992 ) 106.
(^12) The clearest statements areDe an. 430 a 17 – 18 , 22 – 3 , andGen. an. 736 b 28 – 9.
(^13) See Kahn ( 1966 )p. 49 ; Balme ( 1987 ) 9 – 20 ; Hett ( 1957 ) 388.
(^14) SeeSens. 436 a 8. On the method and scope of theParva naturaliasee van der Eijk ( 1994 ) 68 – 72 ; for
a different view see G. R. T. Ross ( 1906 ) 1 : ‘They [theParva naturalia] are essays on psychological
subjects of very various classes, and there is so much detail in the treatment that, if incorporated in
theDe Anima, they would have detracted considerably from the unity and the plan of that work.
Consequent on the separateness of the subjects in theParva Naturalia, the method of treatment is
much more inductive than in theDe Anima. There, on the whole, the author is working outwards
from the general definition of soul to the various types and determinations of psychic existence,
while here, not being hampered by a general plan which compels him to move continually from the
universal to the particular, he takes up the different types of animate activity with an independence
and objectivity which was impossible in his central work.’ It is true that in theParva naturalia
Aristotle makes more (though still very selective) use of empirical data, but he goes out of his way
to make them consistent with his general psychological theory (see ch. 6 in this volume). In spite
of Aristotle’s own characterisation of the scope of theParva naturaliain the beginning ofOn Sense
Perception, it is not easy to characterise the difference with regard toOn the Soulin such a way as
to account for the distribution of information over the various treatises. Even if one is prepared to
regardOn the SoulandParva naturaliaas a continuous discussion of what it basically means for a
living being (an animal or a plant) to live and to realise its various vital functions, or to explain the
relative lack of physiological detail inOn the Soulas the result of a deliberate argumentative strategy,
it remains strange that some very fundamentalformalaspects of the various psychic functions are
dealt with at places where one would hardly expect them (e.g. the discussion of the ‘common sense’
faculty inOn Sleeping and Waking, the discussion of the relation between thought and imagination in
On Memory and Recollection, etc.) and that so many seemingly crucial issues in Aristotle’s psychology
are left vague.