214 Aristotle and his school
power to see resemblances,8 *
) )L^25 at the basis of
rational understanding, which is characteristic of human cognition. Thus
variations that seem to be merely necessary concomitants of other, pur-
posive biological structures and processes – and thus seem to be ‘natural’
K1 -
Lonly in the mechanical sense – can sometimes be accounted
forindirectlyas being ‘natural’K1 -
Lin a teleological sense as well.
This coexistence of two approaches need not be problematic: Aristotle
is very much aware of the difference between teleological and mechanical
explanations and is convinced of their being, to a very large extent,
complementary. One might also say that the principle of ‘naturalness’
K1 -
Lis applied by Aristotle at different levels: he does not shrink
from saying that even within the category of things happening ‘contrary to
nature’K1 -
L, such as the occurrence of deviations, deformations
and monstrosities, there is such a thing as ‘the natural’K3 1 -
L;^26
deviations from the natural procedure can nevertheless display regularity,
such as, again, the melancholics, who are said to benaturallyabnormal.^27
The difficulty that remains, however, is how explanations offered for these
variations and deviations are to be related to explanations offered for the
normal procedure. This difficulty is especially urgent with variations in
intellectual capacities; for these are explained with a reference to differences
inbodilyconditions of the individuals concerned, which raises the question
of what the bodily conditions for a ‘normal’ operating of the intellect are
and how this is to be related to Aristotle’s ‘normative’ view of thinking
as an incorporeal process: is the influence of these bodily conditions in
deviations to be regarded as ‘interference’ in a process whichnormallyhas
no physical aspect whatsoever, or is there also such a thing as a ‘normal’ or
‘healthy’ bodily state which acts as a physical substrate to thinking?
A related difficulty presents itself in the ethical domain. On the one
hand, Aristotle tries to connect his views on what is best for man with
what he believes to be man’snaturalactivityK1 -
L.^28 On the other
hand, he also notoriously tries to provide a biological foundation for his
belief that not all human beings are equally capable of realising the moral
and intellectual virtues,^29 which is at the basis of his views on political
organisation (e.g. his views on the naturalness of the state, slavery, and
(^25) On this principle see Lambert ( 1966 ) and van der Eijk ( 1994 ) 326 and 333.
(^26) Gen. an. 770 b 10 ff. (^27) Eth. Nic. 1154 b 11 ;Pr. 954 b 8 ff.; 955 a 40.
(^28) SeeEth. Nic. 1097 b 25 ff.
(^29) See the condition of natural ability inEth. Nic. 1099 b 17 ff.: ‘In this way, happiness is also common to
many; for it is possible for it to be available through some sort of learning and practising to all those
who are not disabled in respect of virtue’ ( A# 5 J -
[sc.8 (
]T 3
1 H D
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).