Aristotle on the matter of mind 223
of the body. In this respect, it may be useful to note that dwarfsK
L
represent a special human type^60 to which Aristotle refers a number of
times and which is said to suffer from all sorts of structural cognitive weak-
nesses and disturbances. Thus atMem. 453 a 31 , dwarf-like people are said
to have poorer memoriesK" #
Lthan their opposites because
of much weight on their perceptual faculty, which makes it difficult for
them to retain the movements and which also makes it difficult for them
to recollect – which is anintellectualprocess, as he has said in 453 a 10 ff. –
along a straight line.^61 AtSomn. vig. 457 a 22 ff., they are said to sleep much
because of the great upward movement and evaporation (of hot moisture
derived from food). Young children suffer from the same defects,^62 but in
their case growth will bring them to perfection later in their lives.
It is not very clear how the idea of agility of thought and common sense
is to be reconciled with the statement in thePhysicspassage that thinking
consists in rest and stillness. It may be that Aristotle is talking about different
stages of the process,duskin ̄etonreferring to a disturbance of the supply of
appearancesK Lthat provide the intellect with material to think
about and to halt upon (although it is hard to read this into the Greek);
or it may be that he is speaking about different levels, or differenttypes
of movement,duskin ̄etonreferring to a more abstract, less physical type
of movement – although, again, this is not expressed very clearly in the
Greek. It may also be thatduskin ̄etos, as the opposite ofeukin ̄etos, should be
understood as a disturbance of the balance between movement and stillness
(cf. (vs.L, and that the ideal state consists in a mean
between two extremes (cf.Mem. 450 b 1 – 11 ); however, the difficulty that
remains is that this still presupposes some sort of movement, whereas the
Physicspassage seemed to say that thinking depends on the coming to a
standstill of bodily motion. Anyway, the passage also seems to commit itself
to alocationof thinking at a relatively high part of the body.^63
A number of passages briefly allude to incidental disturbances of the intellect
by bodily conditions. Thus in his discussion of ‘imagination’K L
(^60) As appears fromGen. an. 749 a 4 , they are a deformationK #) L. On Aristotle’s views on
dwarfs (and their medical background) see Dasen ( 1993 ) 214 – 20.
(^61) For the notion of ( see 453 a 25 ; see also below, p. 229.
(^62) Children are also mentioned inMem. 453 b 4 ; 450 b 6 ;Somn. vig. 457 a 18 ff.
(^63) The question might be raised why, if the bodily structure of man is supposed to be subservient to the
performance of his ‘most divine’ part, thinking is not located in the brain (as was Plato’s argument
in theTimaeus( 90 a ff.), of which the present passage is clearly reminiscent). However, Aristotle
may have had other reasons for not considering the brain as an ideal location (see Kullmann ( 1982 )
233 – 4 ), and he may have been reluctant to express himself onanylocation of the intellect (see below,
n. 65 ).