Aristotle on the matter of mind 231
the body;^80 and there may be other medical influences as well,^81 especially
of dietetics, for it was certainly one of the claims of dietetics in Aristotle’s
time to provide a physiologically founded doctrine of ‘the good life’.^82 The
Peripatetic school was very receptive to these medical views, as is shown,
for example, by theProblemata physica, and Aristotle was almost certainly
aware of them. Now it is certainly true that Aristotle’s psychology is much
richer and much more sophisticated than that of the medical literature, but
it should not be overlooked that there is also a ‘technical’ side to Aristotle’s
psychology, an interest in the ‘mechanics’ of cognition and in modalities
of thinking such as concentration, analytical powers, creativity, quickness
() of thinking and intuition ("
0 (),^83 habituation
and repetition, anddegreesin capacities to all these activities. It very rarely
comes to the surface inOn the Soul, but it figures more prominently in
theParva naturaliaand in the zoological works, mostly when one species
of animals is compared with another or when different members of one
species are compared with one another, and mostly in contexts in which
some sort of disturbance or aberration in cognitive behaviour is discussed.
It is in these contexts that bodily factors are made responsible for these dis-
turbances or aberrations; Aristotle does not explain what thenormalbodily
conditions for a normal functioning of thinking are, and they can only be
deduced indirectly. However, it is very likely that the concept of ‘the mean’
plays an important part here.^84
This situation provides a parallel (though not a solution) to another
problem in Aristotle’s theory of thinking – which has recently received
much attention and which has already been alluded to above – namely the
question of animal intelligence.^85 In many (although admittedly not all)
of the passages in which Aristotle seems to credit animals with intellectual
capacities he compares one species with another, and in this comparative
perspective man is simply seen as the most intelligent (the use of com-
paratives such as
or superlatives such as
in
these contexts is striking). Here, too, there seems to be a tension between
a ‘relativistic’, biological view of man as a=*nat the end of a scale which
(^80) For a discussion of these chapters see the commentary by Joly and Byl ( 1984 ). See also Jouanna ( 1966 )
and Hankinson ( 1991 b) 200 – 6.
(^81) The cognitive role of the blood reminds us, of course, of Empedocles (see Kullmann ( 1982 ) 230 ).
The doctrine ofpneumamay be inspired by Diocles of Carystus (see Longrigg ( 1995 ) 441 ).
(^82) See Tracy ( 1969 ),passim. On the claims of dietetics, and its relation to philosophy in the fourth
century see also G. W ̈ohrle ( 1990 ), chs. 4 and 5.
(^83) Cf.An. post. 89 b 10 ff.;Eth. Nic. 1142 b 3 – 6 ;Rh. 1362 b 24 ; 1412 a 13 ;To p. 151 b 19 ;Div. somn. 464 a 33.
(^84) On this see the excellent discussion by Tracy ( 1969 ).
(^85) For a survey of the recent discussion see Coles ( 1997 ).