242 Aristotle and his school
also works in those people ‘whose reasoning is disengaged’ (; !
" ! ), as is the case with the melancholics.^17
The problem, then, might also be put as follows. At first sight there
seems to be a discrepancy between, on the one hand, the conclusion of
Eth. Eud. 8. 2 thateutuchiais ‘divine’ and happens ‘through God’, and, on
the other hand, the statements inOn Divination in Sleep, which repeatedly
reject the attribution of divination in sleep^18 to a god.^19 Yet the argument
which Aristotle uses inOn Divination in Sleep(as inMag. mor. 2. 8 ) against
this attribution is the same distribution argument as that used inEth.
Eud. 8. 2 : in the latter chapter, it is at first sufficient to reject the popular
conception of divine guidance or dispensation, but later it no longer forms
an impediment to the conclusion thateutuchiais divine (theia). On any
interpretation it is clear that developmental arguments, such as those used
(^17) See also the discussion in ch. 5 above. On this contrast see Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 490 and 492 ; Flashar
( 1966 ) 60 n. 2. Effe ( 1970 , 84 – 5 ), argues that the sentence 1248 a 39 – 40 is a parenthesis: ‘Die Tr ̈aume
der Melancholiker werden jedoch nicht in dem Sinn verglichen, daß auch sie auf Gott zur ̈uckgef ̈uhrt
werden, sondern nur insofern, als sie – wie die irrationale Mantik – ohne Verwendung des rationalen
Elements das Richtige treffen.’ But Effe fails to appreciate the force of
!(‘this is why’), which
connects the sentence with 38 – 9 : ‘he well sees both the future and the present, also in those people
in whom this reasoning faculty is disengaged’ ($ G +C 3 3 \0 ;
" -
S ! j), and which establishes a causal connection between the clear dreams of
the melancholics and the divine movement, which is stronger in those whose reasoning faculty is
disengaged. It is not correct, therefore, to speak of acomparison: the melancholics are anexample.
Moreover, given that the clear dreams of the melancholics are mentioned in this particular context,
what other cause is there to account for them than God?
(^18) Divination (
) is closely connected witheutuchia, as is shown by the mention of
in
1248 a 35 and of the ‘clear dreams’ ( (
) of the melancholics in 1248 a 39. See Woods ( 1982 )
183 : ‘The power of prophecy is relevant because of the close connection between the right choice
and foreknowledge of the future.’
(^19) This discrepancy has been noted by many interpreters, e.g. by Huby ( 1979 ) 54 – 5 , 57 , 59 ; Natali ( 1974 )
175 – 7 ; Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 483 , 490 , and 492 ; Effe ( 1970 ) 84 – 5 ; Bod ́eus ( ̈ 1981 ) 52 – 3 , 55. On the place
ofEth. Eud. 8. 2 in Aristotle’s theology see also Pepin ( ́ 1971 ) 220 – 2 and 272 – 6 ; Aubenque ( 1963 ) 71 – 5 ;
and von Arnim ( 1928 ) 17 ff. Out of all these interpreters, Effe is the only one who tries to account for
the discrepancy on the strength of non-developmental arguments. According to him, the form of
divination described inEth. Eud. 8. 2 , which he calls ‘enthusiastic divination’, is not what is spoken
of inOn Divination in Sleep: ‘Aristoteles erkennt also die enthusiastische Mantik, bei der Gott direkt
durch den Menschen spricht, an. Das steht nicht in Widerspruch zuDe div. p. somn., denn dort
wird nur die Zuruckf ̈ ̈uhrung der Tr ̈aume auf Gott abgelehnt; die enthusiastische Mantik ist nicht
thematisiert.’ Apart from being forced, in order to sustain this interpretation, to regard 1248 a 39 – 40
as a parenthesis (on which see n. 17 above), Effe fails to appreciate that the argument which Aristotle
here uses to reject the attribution of prophetic dreams to a god, is the same distribution argument
as that used in 1247 a 28 – 9 to reject the attribution ofeutuchiato a god. Effe does not make it clear
why this argument is no impediment to Aristotle’s conclusion of a (inEth. Eud. 1248
a 32 ff. (which he conceives as ‘enthusiastic divination’), whereas it actually is an impediment to the
theory of ‘god-sent dreams’ ( ! -
)inOn Divination in Sleep. Moreover, I do not
think that what Aristotle has in mind inEth. Eud. 8. 2 is the ‘enthusiastic divination’ (‘in which God
speaks directly through human beings’; cf. Effe’s typology of divination on p. 79 ): on this see below,
especially n. 28.