Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 257
in the theory criticised there, a specific form of divine dispensation (
), whereas in 1248 a 32 ff. Aristotle is thinking of a process which
does not consist in such a divine dispensation but in people making use of
a universal divine causality. Secondly, the theory criticised by Aristotle in
1247 a 23 ff. presupposes that divine dispensation regards only the ‘irrational’
('
) people, whereas in 1248 a 32 ff. not only these'
but also
the ‘wise and clever’ ( !
) use the divine movement; the
difference between these two classes of people in their susceptibility to the
divine movement is one of degree rather than kind, and it is based not on
deliberate divine choice but on human nature ( -
).
If this interpretation is convincing, then the discrepancy betweenEth.
Eud. 8. 2 andDiv. somn. has disappeared as well. What Aristotle has in
mind inEth. Eud. 1248 a 32 ff. is the same process of interaction between
a divine movement and a human natural constitution as what he refers
to as the ‘superhuman nature’ inDiv. somn. 463 b 14 (
-
).
The only difference is that theEudemian Ethicsexplicitly mentions ‘God’
( !) as the starting-point (") of the process, whereas inOn Div-
ination in SleepAristotle seems to reject any divine influence whatsoever.
But the reason for this is that inOn Divination in Sleephe combats a
theory which is comparable with the view, rejected inEth. Eud. 1247 a
23 – 9 , that prophetic dreams are caused by deliberate divine dispensation
( ! ). The reason why he does not explicitly mention the divine
aspect of the process of interaction is that the subtleties ofEth. Eud. 8. 2
would certainly undermine his own purpose inOn Divination in Sleep,
which is to reject this popular attribution of prophetic dreams to a god. In
theEudemian Ethics, however, the argument does not breathe the polemi-
cal atmosphere ofOn Divination in Sleep. It seems that Aristotle is arguing
here positively in defence of a view which is unlikely to be accepted by an
audience who, in accordance with the main tenets of Aristotle’s ethical the-
ory, tend to reject any possible cause of human success which is not within
human control ( 5 8 ) and who will cling to a rational way to success
based on !and !#
.^66 In the face of such an audience, ‘God’ (
!) is a far more satisfactory candidate as ‘principle of movement in the
soul’ ("%
) C :C) than ‘chance’ (-#), the rejection
of which remains implicit because of its obvious unsuitability ( 1248 a 22 :
P5 "3 -# I5
); and it is now easy to understand why
Aristotle concludes that God is the starting-point ofeutuchiaonly after a
long and tentative and often aporetic argument.
(^66) See, e.g.,Eth. Eud. 1215 a 12 – 20 ;cf.Eth. Nic. 1099 b 10 ff. and 1179 b 21 ff.