Galen on qualified experience 293
set of conditions and circumstances, actually enables the pharmacologist
to carry out reproducible experiments.^59
Rather than looking for the origin of Galen’s notion of qualified ex-
perience in medical Empiricism (that the Empiricists preferred
over
!seemingly indicates that they modified an already existent
concept), one might argue that his insistence on adequate qualification, or
specification, of empirical statements once more testifies to his indebted-
ness to Aristotelian philosophy. As in so many other respects, Aristotelian
methodology and terminological sophistication also provides the basic con-
stituents of Galen’s scientific instrumentarium in pharmacology (e.g. the
use of the distinctions between’H!and1 <<#!and be-
tween-
and
).^60 The need for appropriate specification of
scientific statements is one of the cornerstones of Aristotle’s philosophy of
science, in which an ‘unqualified premise’ is defined as ‘a statement which
applies or does not apply without reference to universality or particular-
ity’,^61 and in which it is clearly stated that premises that are ‘unqualified’
("
!
) are not suitable for syllogisms.^62 Aristotle’s classical example
of the difference between experience (
) and ‘art’ (#), derived
from therapeutics, aptly illustrates the principle of qualification.^63
4 the conceptualisation of power and effect
We have seen so far that Galen’s notion of qualified experience serves as
an appropriate instrument for dealing with the fact that a certain sub-
stance does not always produce the same results in all cases. Even the very
(^59) On the requirement of reproducibility see, e.g.,De simpl. med. fac. 11. 1 ( 12. 350 K.), andDe plac.
Hipp. et Plat. 7. 3. 13 (CMGv4, 1 , 2 ,p. 442. 13 – 18 De Lacy, 5. 604 K.).
(^60) On Aristotelian elements in Galen’s pharmacology see Harig ( 1974 ) 87 , 93 f., 99 – 105 , 156 – 8 , 166 .On
Galen’s use of Aristotle’s philosophy of science see Tieleman ( 1996 ), ch. 4.
(^61) An. pr. 24 a 20 :"
!
. 3 H
B % H
' $ ! B 1 0
3 * ) , % (% # B 3 % 8% % , "!(the usual translation of" ! in Aristotle is ‘indeterminate’). This is exactly the point raised by Galen with regard to statements about the powers of foodstuffs and drugs (see nn. 20 , 22 and 23 above). (^62) Arist.,An. pr. 29 a 7 – 10 ;cf.An. pr. 26 b 23 andTo p. 131 b 5 – 19 , and the insistence on qualification in the discussion of the law of contradiction inMetaph. 4. 3 ff. (e.g. 1005 b 21 , 28 – 9 ). (^63) Metaph. 981 a 7 – 12 : ‘For to have a judgement that when Callias was suffering from this particular disease, this particular treatment benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and other individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to have a judgement that all people of a certain type, defined as one specific kind, who suffer from this particular disease benefit from this treatment, e.g. phlegmatic or bilious people or people suffering from burning fever, is a matter of skill’K3 . 1 H!#: xn # % ! _) ’4 2) 0 > 3 ’ + ’, 4$'"', # % !0 0
B
[B]
-)n0 #L.
For a discussion of the meaning of this example, and of the textual difficulties involved, see Spoerri
( 1996 ).