The Methodism of Caelius Aurelianus 315
the disease is always the same; and conversely the same causes may lead to
different diseases, as is stated in the following passage:
( 20 ) sciendum igitur, quia haec passio ex iisdem causis antecedentibus fiet, quibus
aliae quoque passiones efficiuntur, indigestione, uinolentia, carnali cibo et horum
similibus rebus. (Acut. 2. 10. 65 , more fully quoted under no. 12 above)
One should know, then, that this disease [sc. catalepsy] originates from the same
preceding causes by which the other diseases are brought about, indigestion, drunk-
enness, the eating of meat and things similar to these.^65
This does not come as a surprise, for the lists of antecedent causes of
various diseases that Caelius offers, are always roughly the same: the taking
of certain foods or drinks, drunkenness, a cold, indigestion, and suchlike.
Hence in the majority of cases, the relevance of antecedent causes is very
limited (because they are not peculiar to the disease), and the reason why
Caelius discusses them altogether may be that they have the same status as
signs:^66 theymayconstitute information that is relevant for the diagnosis
and thus for the identification of a disease – and as such indirectly for the
treatment^67 – but in the majority of cases this is not so.
However, as we have seen, there are cases in which a reference to the cause
(or causes) is relevant, and in these cases it is perfectly all right to engage
in causal explanations, for example in cases where the causes constitute
the relevant criteria or differentiae for treatment as, again, in the case of
haemorrhage, and it does not come as a surprise that in such cases they
appear also in the definition of the disease.
3 definitions
Closely related to the subject of causal explanation is the role of definitions.
Again, a similar pattern may be detected. We are told that the Methodists
refused to give definitions or to make use of other epistemological or log-
ical tools derived from ‘Dogmatist’ dialectic, such as arguments based on
demonstration, analogy or inferences.^68 The reason for this is assumed to
be that the use of such Dogmatist logical tools would commit them to as-
sumptions about the essence of diseases, whereas, for the reasons mentioned
what tetanus is’ (Sed his omnibus [sc. Asclepiadis sectatoribus... aliis... aliis nostrae sectae] communiter
respondendum est, quomodo causa a passione plurimum differt. dicendum est igitur, non quae causa sit
distentionis, sed quae sit distentio).(^65) Cf.Acut. 1. 1. 23. (^66) This is suggested byChron. 1. 4. 105.
(^67) For the requirement of completeness in the symptomatology of the disease seeAcut. 1. 1. 22.
(^68) Galen,De meth. med. 1. 1 ( 10. 5 K.); 1. 3 ( 10. 30 K.); 2. 5 ( 10. 109 K.); see Frede ( 1987 a) 276.