324 Late antiquity
way of treatment based on a consideration of the state of the patient and
the powers of the medicament.^91 This is confirmed byChron. 2. 14. 202 ,
where Caelius refers to a ‘theory of remedies, which is called pharmacology’
(medicaminum ratio, quam pharmacian appellant), where clearly a corpus
of pharmacological knowledge is referred to, which he accepts.
It may not be a coincidence that the criticism of experience (experimen-
tum) occurs precisely in these therapeutic contexts. It seems that especially
in this area,ratiois considered to be a more reliable guide thanexperimen-
tum– predominantly^92 experience as it was relied upon by the Empiricists,
who are criticised for their ‘vain’ attempts, that is, treating their patients by
trial and error, as in the following passage:
( 35 ) et est haec experimenti tentatio, quam Graeci schediasticen piran uocant, quae
non destinata passionibus adhibeat adiutoria, sed probanda. (Chron. 5. 2. 46 )
And this method is one of trying by means of improvisation, which the Greeks call
schediastice peira, which makes use of remedies that are not directed at the diseases
themselves but which (as yet) have to be tested.^93
The wording of this passage suggests that what Caelius criticises is the lack
of a suitable orientation (destinata) and the failure to make use of relevant
information about the state of the patient and the powers of the medica-
ment – and for this orientation and consideration of relevant information,
reason is an indispensable guide.^94 To be sure, this criticism applies, to
some extent, toallnon-Methodist treatment,^95 since Caelius believes also
(^91) For other examples seeAcut. 3. 8. 97 ; 3. 16. 137 ;Chron. 1. 4. 87. Cf. Gourevitch ( 1991 ) 69 : ‘Le m ́ethodisme,
donc, nous l’avons d ́ej`a dit, est un dogmatisme; comme tout dogmatisme il va au traitement par un
raisonnement.’ In some cases, e.g.Chron. 1. 5. 175 , Caelius’ appeal toratiois ironical, because it refers
to the erroneous therapeutic reasoning of other medical schools (cf. Drabkin’s note ad loc.).
(^92) Though not exclusively, as is shown by the criticism of Praxagoras inChron. 1. 4. 135 (see n. 95 below),
and of Asclepiades inAcut. 2. 9. 43.
(^93) For other criticisms ofexperimentumsee, e.g.,Acut. 1. 15. 127 ; 1. 17. 170 ; 3. 4. 45 ; 3. 8. 97 ; 3. 16. 137 ;Chron.
- 129 ; 1. 5. 178 ; 5. 2. 46 .Forratioin criticism of Empiricist therapy cf.Acut. 2. 29. 160.
(^94) Another illuminating passage isAcut. 3. 4. 45 : ‘But it is clear that this is all a matter of experimenting
and trial and based on obscure speculations. For the Empiricist looks only at observation, which they
callteresis, and believes that in this case only full-blooded people should be venesected, not realising
that because of the severity of the stricture all those who suffer from synanche should be venesected,
as long as their strength permits’ (sed hoc omne experimentum siue tentatio promptissime ex occultis
suspicionibus uidetur esse prouisa. etenim Empiricus solam seruationem intuens, quam teresin uocant,
sanguinosos nunc phlebotomandos existimatnon aduertens, quia omnes synanchicos ob stricturae
uehementiam oportet phlebotomari permittentibus uiribus). Cf. alsoAcut. 3. 8. 97 : ‘Frog soup
may be called an experiment and it is offensive, as of itself it has no advantage which reason proves’
(iuscellum autem ranarum experimentum esse dicitur et est odiosum, in semet nihil habens commodi,
quod ratio probet).
(^95) SeeChron. 1. 4. 135 : ‘All these measures are tested neither by reason nor by diet, but by trying them
out’ (haec omnia [sc. remedia Praxagorae] experta neque ratione neque regula, sed tentatione probantur).
Cf.Acut. 3. 8. 97 (criticism of Asclepiades) andChron. 1. 5. 178 (criticism of the leaders of the other
sects).
- 129 ; 1. 5. 178 ; 5. 2. 46 .Forratioin criticism of Empiricist therapy cf.Acut. 2. 29. 160.