MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

(Ron) #1
On the Sacred Disease 57

is mentioned. Of course the validity of this argument depends on the

assumption of a common author ofOn the Sacred DiseaseandAirs, Waters,

Placesand on the presumption that he has not changed his opinion on the

subject – a long-standing issue which is still a matter of disagreement. It

is evident that this question would have to be settled on other grounds as

well, for possible divergencies in the concepts of the divine expressed in

the two treatises might equally well be taken as ground for assuming two

different authors.^33

Perhaps none of these considerations can be regarded as genuine objections.

But it can hardly be denied that the first interpretation necessarily presup-

poses all of them and that the champions of this interpretation should

take account of them. It therefore remains to consider whether the second

interpretation ( 2 ) rests on less complicated presuppositions.

On this interpretation the disease is divine in virtue of having aphusis,a

‘nature’ (in the sense defined above: a regular pattern of origin and growth).

This appears to be closer to the text of the three passages quoted: the

mention ofphusisin 1. 2 and 2. 1 – 2 in the immediate context of the claim

that epilepsy is not more divine than other diseases can easily be understood,

since it is exactly its ‘having a nature’ which constitutes the divine character

of the disease. A further advantage of this interpretation is that the referent of

‘the same (i.e. origin)’ ($ ($) is immediately supplied by the context

(‘have a nature from which each of them arises’,-

 
...  4


 

) and that in 18. 2 the sentence ‘and each of them has a nature and a


power of its own, and none is hopeless or impossible to deal with’ (-




. 4...(’" ) can be taken as providing the explanation

of ‘all are divine and all are human’ (       "

):


all diseases are divine in virtue of having a nature and a power of their

own, and all are human in virtue of being capable of human treatment and

cure, with the phrase ‘none is hopeless or impossible to deal with’ ((.

'! 

 (’" ) answering ‘it is in no respect less curable


than the others... ’ (

#3 ,
(. 6 7))in 2. 3 ( 6. 364 L.).


This corresponds very well with the use of ‘human’K"

Lin the


author’s criticism of the magicians ( 1. 25 , 6. 358 L.; 1. 31 , 6. 360 L.): whereas in

their conception of the divinity of the disease ‘divine’ and ‘human’ exclude

each other, the author regards it as one of his merits to have shown that

(^33) On this question see, e.g., Heinimann ( 1945 ) 181 – 206 ; a useful summary of the discussion is given by
Norenberg ( ̈ 1968 ) 9 – 11 ; on the significance of similarities and discrepancies between the two treatises
for the question of their authorship cf. Grensemann ( 1968 c) 7 – 18 and the interesting analysis by
Ducatillon ( 1977 ) 197 – 226 ; see also van der Eijk ( 1991 ).

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