Diocles of Carystus on the method of dietetics 81
This interpretation has the advantage that the referent ofphusisis immedi-
ately supplied by the context; moreover, as we shall see below, it has some
support from what follows in section 8. A second possible interpretation
is that ‘the whole nature’ refers to the sum of natural factors that play a
part in the production by a certain substance of a certain dietetic effect
with a certain patient. Indeed, a number of such factors are mentioned
by Galen in the pages following on the Diocles fragment: not only the
‘peculiar essence’ (
() of the substance itself, but also climate,
geographical area, season, a patient’s natural constitution, his way of life (1
# - ), his age, particular characteristics of the stomach and the
intestines determine the effect a foodstuff produces in a particular case.^16
Yet it may be objected against this interpretation that the words ‘are used to
occur’ ( <
A) ) indicate that Diocles is here concerned with the
general rather than with the particular – although the very use of ‘used to’
( A) ), in combination with the words ‘least fail to hit the truth’ (Z
" # ) in section 7 , suggests an awareness on Diocles’
part that the effect a substance produces cannot be predicted for all cases. A
third interpretation of ‘the whole nature’ has been proposed by Jaeger, who
argued that the nature of the consuming organism is meant, that is, the
constitution of its body, its age, and so on.^17 This interpretation introduces
an element which is not provided by contextual evidence, for the consumer
or his body is nowhere mentioned in the fragment. It therefore seems best
to interpret the words ‘the whole nature’ as referring to the nature of the
foodstuff.
In section 8 Diocles criticises a third claim, which is, like the first, pre-
sented as a view which is actually being held by a certain group (‘those
who believe...’,/...
!
). The claim seems to be that in every par-
ticular case, one should state the cause why a thing (again we may think
of a foodstuff ) has a certain dietetic power. At first sight, this claim looks
rather different from the ones discussed earlier, for what is at issue is not
the identity or the kind of causes sought for but the search for causes itself.
Moreover, there is a shift of attention from the universal (‘all’, in
section 5 ) to the particular (‘each’, 5 7 in section 8 ). Diocles’ refu-
tation of it calls for close consideration. His first argument seems rather
obvious: for practical purposes, causal explanation is not often ‘necessary’.
For instance, when we know that a certain foodstuff is profitable for people
(^16) Galen,De alim. facult. 1. 1. 16 ff. (pp. 207 ff. Helmreich, 6. 462 ff. K.).
(^17) Jaeger ( 1938 a) 29 ; in the sequel to Galen’s argument, this is referred to as ‘the body of the living
being that takes in the nourishment’K3 $ =C * , see, e.g., 1. 1. 27 ,p. 210 , 13
Helmreich, 6. 469 K.), but there is no indication for this in Diocles’ words themselves.