legislation as far as procedure is concerned except that made under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution. In arriving at this conclusion 1 draw fortitude from the decision of the Court of
Appeal for East Africa in the case of National Insurance Corporation -vs- Kafeero f1974] E.A
- In that case the respondent sued the appellant as nominal defendant in respect of injuries
caused by unidentified vehicle. He had given the notice required by the Traffic and Road Safety
Act 1970, S.44 (2) but not that required by the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1969 S.I. The High Court held that the notice under the latter Act was not
required. Nyamunchoncho J, (as he then was) stated:
"1 am inclined to the view that when the nominal defendant is sued a notice pursuant to section
44 of the Traffic Act is all that is required. If I am mistaken in this, I would still hold that a notice
given under Section 44 to the nominal defendant satisfies the requirement of Section 1 of Act 20
of 1969 by virtue 44 of the Interpretation Act. "
The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusion. SPRY Ag. P at page 478 provided the
following explanation, which was substantially echoed by the opinions of Mustafa and Musoke,
J.J.A:
I see the matter in a somewhat different light. Sections 40 to 48 of the Traffic Act create rights of
action and also contain and also contain procedural provisions, including provisions for notice
clearly intended to give the appellant corporation reasonable opportunity to investigate claims
while the evidence is fresh. It seems to me that the legislature enacted what amounts in a small
way, to a code, and that its provisions including as they do both substantive and procedural law
were intended or must be deemed, so far as they extend to be exclusive."
Mustafa J.A put it thus:
"... because the Traffic Act has special provisions granting certain substantive rights as well as
laying down a reasonably comprehensive set of rules of procedure for enforcing such rights. A
litigant suing under the provisions of the Traffic Act has to comply with provisions of the Traffic
Act...”
The nature of jurisdiction granted under a similar Article to Article 22 of our Constitution was
considered by Privy Council in the case of Jaundoo -vs- Attorney General of Guyana [1971] Ac.
972 on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Guyana. At the time the Parliament of Guyana had
not made provisions for the practice and procedure of the High Court in the enforcement of
similar fundamental rights and freedoms. Lord Diplock while delivering the opinion of the Privy
Council stated at page 983:
"That right is expressed to be subject only to the provisions of paragraph (6). So long as nothing
has been done by Parliament or by the rule making authority of the Supreme Court of Judicature
ordinance, to regulate the practice of procedure upon such applications, the right to apply to the
High Court under paragraph 1 remains in their Lordships view unqualified. To "apply to the
High Court for redress" was not a term of art at the time the Constitution was made. It was an
expression, which was first used in the Constitution of 1961 and was not descriptive of any
procedure, which then existed under rules of Court for enforcing any legal right. It was a newly
created right of access to the High Court to invoke a jurisdiction which was itself newly created
by Article 13(2) of the 1961 Constitution now replaced by Article 19(2). These words in their