from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the
unlawful conduct stopped’.
In R v Inspectorate of pollution and another, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd. (No2)[1994] 4 ALLER
329 (QB) the court upheld the Locus Standi of the Greenpeace organization. At 350e-f, Otton J
stated that if he were to deny standing to Greenpeace, ‘those it represents might not have an
effective way to bring the issues before the court. There would have to be an application either by
individual, employee or a near neighbour. In this case it is unlikely that either would be able to
command the expertise which is at the disposal of Greenpeace. Consequently less well-informed
challenge might be mounted which would stretch unnecessarily the court’s resources and which
would not afford the court the assistance it requires in order to do justice between the people.’
One of the principle objections often raised against the adoption of a more flexible approach to
the problem of Locus Standi is that floodgates will thereby be opened giving rise to an
uncontrollable torrent of litigation it is well however to bear in mind a remark made by Mr.
Justice Kirby, president of the New Wales South Court of Appeal in the course of an address at
the Tenth Anniversary conference of the Legal Resources Centre namely that it may sometimes
be necessary to open the floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below them. I am not
persuaded by the agreement that to afford Locus Standi to a body such as first applicant in
circumstances such as these would be to open the floodgates to a torrent of frivolous litigation
against the state by cranks. Neither am I persuaded given the exorbitant costs of Supreme Court
litigation that should the law be so adapted cranks would indeed flood the courts with frivolous
applications against the state. Should they be tempted to do so I have no doubt that an appropriate
order of costs would soon inhibit their litigious ardour.
In any event whilst cranks who attempt to abuse legal process do no doubt exist, I am of the view
that lawyers are sometimes unduly apprehensive and pessimistic about the strength of their
numbers. The meddlesome crank and busybody with no legal interest in a matter what so ever,
mischievously intent on gaining access to the court in order to satisfy some personal caprice or
obsession is in my view as has been remarked elsewhere more often a spectral figure than a
reality.
Twenty-one years have passed since Professor Van Niekerk’s clarion call for an adaptation of the
law relating to Locus Standi in environmental matters. It may well be that the submissions made
by him have come of age and that the time has arrived for a re examination of the common law
rules of standing in environmental matters involving the state and for an adaptation of such rules
to meet the ever changing needs of society. Compare M .M. Corbett ‘Aspects of the role of policy
in the evolution of our Common Law’ {1987} 104 SALJ 52.
The Application for a mandamus against first respondent
As will have been seen from the above exposition of the facts the crisp defense raised by the first
respondent is that in view of the fact that the task group was to applicants knowledge, addressing
the very issues raised by this application and that action has in fact been taken by first respondent
in regard to these issues the application is unnecessary and amounts to an abuse of the process of
court.
The court has a general inherent power to set aside proceedings on the ground that they are
frivolous and that they amount to an abuse of the process of the court. In Sher and others v
Sadowitz 1970(1) SA 193 Corbett J (as he then was) reiterated that it is clear that the power is
one that should be sparingly exercised and only in very exception cases and that the court must be